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FOREWORD
Renewed interest in the Asia-Pacific region entails
greater U.S. responsibilities and involvement in the
area’s problems. Of all the issues the United States will
face in the region, none may involve as many players; legal, economic, and security interests; intricate
considerations; historic implications; or persistent, if
low key, conflict as the intractable disputes around
the Spratly Islands. And none of the issues are probably as poorly understood by U.S. policymakers as the
South China Sea disputes.
For these reasons, the Strategic Studies Institute
(SSI) is pleased to publish this timely analysis of the
Spratly Islands dispute. It examines the economic and
security importance of the region to the surrounding
claiming states: the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines,
and the violent acts and potential for instability in the
region that has resulted. To better understand the positions of these parties, this monograph then delves
into the customary international law claims for sovereignty through historic and occupation doctrines,
and the subsequent maritime jurisdiction claims made
through the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea. U.S. interests and resulting involvement are
also explained to better understand these positions
and inform U.S. policymakers on actions the United
States may take to promote peace and economic development in an important region consisting of allies
and crucial trading and security partners. This monograph then makes practical suggestions to directly
improve U.S. security and economic interests in the
region. SSI will publish a second monograph on the
South China Sea disputes around the Paracel Islands
to complement this analysis.
v

In the end, the conflict in the Spratly Islands is not
one for the United States to solve, but its ability to contribute, facilitate, balance, or to support is necessary
toward a solution from which all may benefit in the
long term.
			

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
The region around the Spratly Islands and the
South China Sea is important to the economies of
the surrounding states in terms of fish resources and
the potential for natural gas and oil. This bonanza of
riches spurs out-sized claims in the region that result
in diplomatic and physical clashes. The large flow
of maritime commerce around the Spratly Islands is
also crucial to the economic well-being of the region
and the world, and occupation of the islands dictates
control of the surrounding sea’s maritime traffic, security, and economic exploitation. Their importance is
seen in the 50 remote military garrisons on these islets
by the claiming states, and the decades-long history
of military and civilian enforcement clashes which
increase the risk of conflict.
The use of customary law and the United National
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in establishing claims to the Spratlys and surrounding waters
helps explain the perspectives of the disputants. Their
legal positions are especially important for American policymakers as they inform possible solutions
and suggest how to contribute to peace and prosperity in the region. Three key legal questions must be
answered to help sort the disputes: sovereignty over
the islets, the nature of a claimed land feature, and
the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction. Sovereignty
is claimed through customary law, with the People’s
Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, and Vietnam using
historic doctrine to claim the entire South China Sea,
while they also use the doctrine of occupation to claim
some land features, the method which the Philippines
and Malaysia also employ. Each are also disputed
with counterclaims by other South China Sea states,
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leaving no state holding effective legal sovereignty
over all.
Once sovereignty and feature type are determined, zones of authority may be established by the
occupying state, depending on the distance from its
established shore baseline. Internal, archipelagic, and
historic waters are maritime variations of near-full
sovereign control, which could be disruptive to economic and navigation activities if awarded to Vietnam
or China, both of which make such claims. Islands
above the high tide mark establish territorial waters
and a contiguous zone, which would carve 24 nautical
mile (nm) zones like Swiss cheese around the Spratlys,
but should allow innocent passage. The length of the
200-nm exclusive economic zone (EEZ) allows much
potential overlap among land masses and islands
in the semi-enclosed South China Sea, and, like territorial waters, some states restrict military activities
within the EEZ. Although such arguments by claimants for more restrictions in these zones are tenuous,
they could be useful justification to cover military actions by states like the PRC, which is the most active
in enforcing a restrictive EEZ.
Freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is
the most immediate concern for the United States to
ensure naval vessels retain all rights of access. Current policy in China, Vietnam, and Malaysia restrict
foreign naval activities in their zones beyond those
normally attributed to UNCLOS. Concluding an Incidents at Sea Agreement with the PRC would clarify
the rights and responsibilities between the two. Other
forms of government to government interaction could
build confidence in present and future agreements,
and leverage common interests. U.S. ratification of
UNCLOS is another important step to influence the
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evolution of future interpretations of freedom of navigation toward more open use. Although a more difficult proposition, the United States should demand the
clarification of the historic claims made in the South
China Sea so as to facilitate negotiating a settlement,
and accelerate economic development.
Open economic access to the South China Sea maritime commons is a second U.S. interest, but one which
may diverge from freedom of navigation. Access to the
resources of the high seas is an important enough U.S.
interest to stall U.S. ratification of UNCLOS for nearly
20 years. While the United States remains outside the
treaty, however, it holds less influence over how maritime law is interpreted and evolves, and thus is at a
disadvantage to shape events like whether the South
China Sea becomes a wholly divided and claimed sea.
Such arrangements as a Joint Development Zone or a
Joint Management Zone could stabilize the area and
facilitate economic development for its participants.
To support any of the joint development solutions, the
United States would have to place its security interests
over potential economic ones.
To contribute to overall stability and prosperity in
the region, the United States must delicately play the
roles of conciliator and balancer as circumstances require. The United States is an honest broker because
it shares goals in common with the states around the
South China Sea. Although the United States may not
be truly neutral, it has less direct demands in the disputes, garnered more trust than most other states, and
possesses resources to bear on these issues, making it
a useful interlocutor in resolving problems.
In other circumstances, the United States has intervened in problems around the Spratly Islands in
more parochial ways to balance the diplomatic field in
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aid of allies and defense partners and to directly protect its freedom of navigation interests. This balancer
role should deter aggression, is dictated by U.S. treaty
obligation to the Philippines, and is needed because
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
lacks a defense arrangement by which to counter the
influence of the PRC. The balancing role, however,
should be minimal so as to not to overshadow the
conciliator role.
The United States has again made the Asia-Pacific region a major focus of its stated global interests,
and converging national interests between the United
States and China may indicate that some progress on
the issues outlined here are possible. The importance
of the Spratly Islands region to world trade, energy,
and security, as well as its own national interests require careful American involvement. To best address
the disputes, policymakers must understand the underlying territorial and maritime claims of the PRC,
Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and
the Philippines in order to help manage these issues
peacefully and equitably for the regional states, and
to meet U.S. interests. In the end, the conflict in the
Spratly Islands is not one for the United States to
solve, but its ability to contribute, facilitate, balance, or
support is necessary toward a solution from which all
may benefit.
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Source: David Lai, The United States and China in Power Transition,
Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
December 2011.

Map 1. South China Sea.
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Map 2. The Spratley Islands.

Source: “The Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands,” Map 801947, Washington, DC: Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), December 1995.

DANGEROUS GROUND:
THE SPRATLY ISLANDS AND U.S. INTERESTS
AND APPROACHES
Whoever dominates the sea dominates world trade;
whoever dominates world trade dominates the Golconda [a location of great wealth]; whoever dominates
the Golconda dominates the world. . . . Boost the shipping industry to expand the navy, let our national
navy keep pace with the big powers and get into the
rank of first-class powers. The only way for China to
become prosperous is to develop its military arms.1
		
		

Sun Yat-sen,
Founder and first President
of the Republic of China

The South China Sea is one of the most strategic
waterways in the world, for its sea lanes have been
heavily used by fisherman, merchantmen, and war
ships for 2,000 years. During that time, its tiny groupings of islets, reefs, banks, cays, shoals, atolls, and
exposed rocks constituting the Maccelesfield Bank,
Scarborough Shoal, and Paratas, Paracel, and Spratly
Islands have posed deadly hazards to navigation that
tarred this region with the maritime epithet of “the
Dangerous Ground.”2 Although modern navigation
has reduced the risk of shipwreck in the region, it
remains a junction where international interests and
rivalries clash—sometimes quite violently—keeping
the name of “Dangerous Ground” a politically apt
one. The waters and islets of the South China Sea suffer conflicting claims in whole or in part made by the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), Republic of China
(ROC or Taiwan), Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei, and are vital international
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waters for maritime states like India, Australia, the
Republic of Korea (South Korea), Japan, and the United States. The bitter nature of the claims to this area,
which possesses rich fish stocks, oil and natural gas
potential, and security importance, markedly increases their significance to the claimants in southeastern
Asia, and to other nautical powers with interests in
the high seas and stability in this rapidly developing
strategic region.
Because the Spratly Islands are an especially complicated, emotional, and central part of the South
China Sea disputes, this monograph delves into why
this tiny archipelago warrants better understanding
by U.S. policymakers in order to discuss nuanced
responses to the region’s challenges. To attain that
needed understanding, legal aspects of customary
and modern laws are explored to analyze the differences between competing maritime and territorial
claims, and why and how the parties involved stake
rival claims or maritime legal rights. Throughout, the
policies of the United States are examined through its
conflicted interests in the region. Recommendations
for how the United States should engage these issues,
a more appropriate task than trying to solve the disputes outright, are then offered. Since the problems
in the waters around the Spratly Islands are daunting
enough, dealing with the other disputed parts of the
South China Sea are left for further study, although
many topics discussed here may also be gainfully applied elsewhere in the region. U.S. contributions to
regional solutions are predicated upon a better understanding of the many issues involved.
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THE SPRATLY ISLANDS REGION AND WHY IT
IS IMPORTANT
The South China Sea is a body of water in Southeast Asia partially enclosed by the continental coasts
of Vietnam and China, and portions of the shores of
Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia. Hundreds of tiny geologic features dot the
122,648,000 square nautical miles (nm2) of the South
China Sea, or one and half times the size of the Mediterranean Sea, although its largest natural grouping,
the approximately 1703 features of the Spratly Islands
archipelago, covers a total of less than 3 nm2 of land
above sea level nestled in an area spanning 58,000 nm2
of sea.4 The Spratly Islands are centered in the southern half of the South China Sea approximately 300-nm
east of Vietnam, 200-nm west of the Philippines, and
800-nm south of the Chinese mainland. The core Spratlys grouping stretches 315-nm from northern Northeast Cay to southern Louisa Reef, and 240-nm from
western Ladd Reef to eastern Investigator Northeast
Shoal. The ocean floor in this area is relatively shallow compared to the much deeper northern half, but
is mostly cut off from the surrounding continental
shelves by troughs as deep as 5,000 meters.5 Although
unremarkable in its composition, the physical proximity and characteristics of these features, surrounding
waters, and ocean floor play a very important role
in the disputes of the region and potential ways to
address them.
Local Economic Importance of the Spratly Region.
Joining the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the warm
South China Sea is among the most biologically diverse areas in the world, rich in both endangered spe3

cies and commercial fish like tuna, mackerel, scads,
and coral reef fish.6 The South China Sea is one of
the earth’s most productive fishing zones in terms of
its annual maritime catch representing about 10 percent of the world’s total take, and contributes about
half of the fish eaten in the Philippines, Vietnam, and
China—especially in poorer coastal areas.7 Seafood
was also Vietnam’s second largest foreign exchange
earner in 2010 accounting for 7 percent of its exports,
and composed over 4 percent of the Philippines’ gross
domestic product (GDP) in 2009.8 The nature of the
partially enclosed South China Sea and migratory nature of these fish stocks mean this important source of
food and trade is a shared resource among the bordering states posing a “tragedy of the commons” dilemma in managing its stocks and genetic sustainability.9
Since the late-1990s, over-fishing, coral reef damage,
and coastal and shipping pollution have threatened
the sustainability of fishing in the South China Sea,
with no substantial international coordination yet in
place to halt continuing dwindling of fishing stocks.10
Instead, declining stocks in home waters have forced
fisherman into waters claimed by other states, precipitating adverse reactions by maritime law enforcement
officials in order to protect the commercial interests
within their claimed areas. Fishing-related incidents
thus are common in the South China Sea and sometimes lead to diplomatic or armed clashes.11
The extraction of hydrocarbon energy resources
in the South China Sea also suffers under the tension
of being an asset of the maritime commons. The shallower southern South China Sea, which includes the
Spratly Islands, has been called a “second Persian
Gulf” or “hydrocarbons Eldorado” for its rich potential.12 Certainly the possibility for energy strikes in the
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area’s sedimentary basins exists. However, the Spratly Islands region itself remains largely unexplored so
estimates vary widely.13 The U.S. Energy Information
Administration (USEIA) in 2013 gives proven or probable reserves in the Spratly region at virtually none for
oil and only .1 trillion cubic feet (tcf) for natural gas.
However, USEIA estimated the potential for undiscovered oil at between .8 and 5.4 billion barrels (bbl)
and 7 to 55 tcf for gas. The PRC’s Chinese National
Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) offers a far more optimistic estimate of 125 bbl of oil and 500 tcf of gas in
undiscovered resources,14 which is five times China’s
current proven reserves in both resources. This may be
skewed in order to encourage investment and exploration since China’s domestic production has peaked,
and it depends heavily on imported energy.15 China
needs the “sweeter” crude oil that comes from the
South China Sea because it is easier for overburdened
Chinese refineries to process, makes China more energy independent as its demand for oil doubles and
natural gas quadruples in the next 25 years, and reduces the debilitating air pollution of burning coal
which now accounts for much of its energy.16
The exploration for oil in the vicinity of the Spratly
Islands started in the 1970s around Reed Bank by a
Philippine consortium including U.S. companies, but
the results were meager. The PRC started drilling in
1992 near Vanguard Bank, using the American company, Crestone, while just to the west, the Vietnamese
explored the Blue Dragon block with Mobil, and to
the southeast, Malaysia contracted with Sabah Shell.17
Further afield in the South China Sea, commercial
drilling proceeds in Malaysia’s Central Luconia gas
fields off the coast of Sarawak, in Indonesia’s Natuan Island gas field, and Vietnam’s Lan Tay and Lan
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Do (or Nam Con Son) gas fields.18 The Philippine’s
Malampaya field, northwest of Palawan island and
just outside the Spratlys area, may hold 2.7 tcf of natural gas reserves, but is the only producing gas field
in the Spratly region.19 The belief that such finds may
extend to the Spratly Islands’ waters, whose central
placement makes maritime possession uncertain,
encourages the affected parties to make competing,
sometimes outsized, claims for this wealth.20
The richest part of the Spratlys may be shallow
Reed Bank, in the northeast corner and only 150-nm
from the Philippine’s Palawan Island, but it is also
claimed by the PRC, Taiwan, and Vietnam. After natural gas was discovered there in 2002, the Philippines
assigned concessions for its development; however,
Chinese pressure has halted subsequent activities in
Reed Bank.21 Such overlapping claims make financing
and exploration to confirm potential energy reserves
in the region more costly and risky, as demonstrated
by Beijing’s threats to the businesses of foreign companies in China if they help develop the stakes of
other claimants.22 Further complicating the problem is
that more than 200 international companies are contracted for oil and natural gas services in the greater
South China Sea region which internationalizes and
complicates the dispute because China disapproves
of foreign companies being involved in the region.23
International energy companies have the expertise
needed to develop these waters but remain reluctant
to do so, needing long-term stability in the region.24
The potential for major energy finds in the Spratly
Islands area has driven the energy-poor but rapidly
developing surrounding states to press aggressive
claims for this disputed commons which, in turn, hobbles their efforts by making exploration and exploita-
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tion economically more risky, politically contentious,
and militarily dangerous.25
Unfortunately, the states claiming this area “view
the competition for access to and ownership of the resources as a zero-sum game.”26 For instance, after the
2008 dissolution of the disappointing Joint Maritime
Seismic Undertaking (JMSU), the first and only multilateral cooperative development arrangement among
the South China Sea states, its former members, Vietnam, the Philippines, and the PRC, began to explore
unilaterally in their overlapping claimed areas, and
China increased the number of its enforcement vessels
in the region.27 Claims have intensified as new technology has made previously difficult offshore oil and gas
more accessible, while high energy prices make their
potential more lucrative.28 Thus political and armed
clashes may occur in order to develop this energy potential before others exploit it first.
If the waters around the Spratlys have historically
been rich fishing grounds and today portend hydrocarbon wealth, the land features themselves have offered much less in economic activities and have never
been permanently inhabited beyond recent military
garrisons.29 The earliest visitors to the Spratlys may
have been Chinese traders collecting feathers and tortoise shells, but most of the early Chinese references
to the South China Sea mainly warned of the danger from the reefs, and the geologic features served
mostly as landmarks to navigators and occasional
shelter to fisherman.30 In 1877, Britain made probably
the first Western-style claim to any of the islands for
the southerly Spratly Island and Amboyna Cay to
exploit their guano deposits (for use in making fertilizer and soap).31 Tomas Cloma started the Philippines’
unofficial claim to most of the Spratlys in 1947 also
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in order to gather guano and to establish a fish cannery.32 None of these activities were seriously pursued. The climate and tiny land area available in the
Spratlys offers little agricultural promise, although the
Taiwanese have grown pineapples on Itu Aba, the
largest island in the Spratly group, and Vietnam has
experimented with growing trees for shade and fencing on its occupied islets.33 Some experts see the possibility for marine based tourism in the region, such as
Malaysia has done for its human-enhanced Swallow
Reef which has become a premier dive resort sharing
space with a military installation and airstrip.34 Collectively, transnational ecotourism has been targeted
through the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines
East Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) through government and
private sector investment that could be followed in
the South China Sea.35 However, all of this collecting,
farming, and tourism potential of the land features financially pales in comparison to the surrounding waters’ fishing and drilling activities. The islets have yet
to produce any sustained economic yield, or as Timo
Kivimaki concludes in his anthology on the South
China Sea, “these areas have only been economically
meaningful when the small reefs and islands have disrupted sea lines of communication.”36
Regional Security Importance of the Spratlys.
Although economically not significant, the land
features of the Spratlys may hold military importance
for the states occupying or claiming them. The historically high amount of shipping which transits the South
China Sea gives significance to the Spratly Islands for
sea lane defense, maritime interdiction, early warn-
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ing, and surveillance. During World War II, Japanese
imperial forces claimed all and occupied key parts of
the South China Sea, constructing a submarine support base on Itu Aba as part of their efforts to successfully cut Allied shipping in the region. The islets also
served as forward staging bases for invasions of the
Philippines, the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia),
and Malaya.37 From 1840 to 1949, one Chinese scholar
counted 479 attacks launched against China from the
sea, with 84 of those being major assaults.38 During the
Vietnam War, U.S. bomber and surveillance missions
were flown from Guam and Okinawa over the South
China Sea, which China and North Vietnam protested
as violating each one’s sovereignty.39 This military
legacy particularly menaces modern China’s prosperity since 50 percent of its petroleum is imported from
overseas, and 90 percent of its foreign trade is through
shipping, much through the South China Sea from
China’s booming southern provinces.40 To counter
this potential threat, Chinese military leaders consider
the South China Sea important to the PRC’s security,
and their maritime “near sea strategy” is to neutralize
any threat within the “first island chain,” defined as a
line connecting Borneo with the Philippine, Taiwan,
Ryukyu, Japanese, and Kurile Islands, to ensure access to the Pacific Ocean and prevent a “Great Wall
in reverse.”41 Having actually sustained attacks from
the Spratly Islands, other South China Sea states also
want to control some or all of the Spratly features for
their own protection. For instance, since the 1980s, the
Philippines government considers the adjacent Spratly group “vital to the defense of its western perimeter” and to its economic survival.42 Such sentiment
explains, in part, the regional land grab for otherwise
uninhabited and unproductive land features. Terri-
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torial disputes have often been a motive for fighting
between states, which is why one analyst dubbed the
Spratly Islands “the least unlikely trigger” to start a
conflict in the South China Sea.43
In order to defend national security and further
their claims, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and the PRC have garrisoned many of the
Spratly features. Accurate numbers and dispositions
for military forces are difficult to ascertain, but reasonably reliable numbers are reported here to portray
their scope. A total of over 1,500 troops are probably
deployed to between 45 and 52 positions in the Spratlys.44 Following the abandonment of the Spratlys by
the Japanese after World War II, the ROC was the first
to occupy a position in 1946, but these forces were
withdrawn after the Nationalist forces retreated to
Taiwan.45 In 1956, about 500 marines were re-stationed
on Itu Aba, Taiwan’s only occupation, but that force
was reduced to 110 in the late-1990s. The islet was
further demilitarized in 2000 by stationing only coast
guardsmen there, although a 1,000 meter airstrip was
completed in 2008 to allow rapid reinforcement.46 In
1975, Vietnam occupied 13 positions, and today garrisons the most features at around 29, with about 600
troops. Vietnamese forces maintain a 600-meter runway on Spratly Island itself, the region’s fourth largest
island.47 Since 1971, the Philippines has occupied eight
to nine of its approximate 53 claimed geographical
structures with about 500 marines (down from 1,000
in the 1990s), and completed a 1,300-meter runway in
1981 on Thitu Island, the region’s second largest island.48 Since 1983, Malaysia has manned five of its 12
claimed features with 70 soldiers. Its largest, the geographically enhanced Swallow Reef, also includes a
600-meter commercial and military airport.49
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The PRC was late in joining the scramble in 1988,
but has aggressively settled about seven reefs and
rocks, some since upgraded with helipads.50 Some of
these features are close to those already occupied by
other forces in a possible attempt to neutralize any
claim by other states to the surrounding seas. The 1992
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) landing on Da Ba
Dau Reef, near Vietnamese occupied Sin Cowe East
Island, resulted in a skirmish with nearby Vietnamese forces.51 The PLA’s 1995 seizure of Mischief Reef,
previously abandoned by Philippine forces although
within the Philippine’s Alcorn oil concession area, significantly raised tensions between the two countries.
Tensions flared again after construction of upgraded
military structures on these rocks in 1998—although
no actual fighting ensued either time.52 A U.S. Government report placed the total contingent of Chinese
marines at 325 in 1999, although other estimates report it as low as 260 personnel.53 Many of the smaller
outposts, especially the Chinese ones, are precarious
manmade platforms perched above tiny rocks or even
submerged reefs.54 The seizure of features has stopped
since the late-1990s, however, in part because the most
suitable features are already occupied and because
these remote desolate outposts are expensive to maintain.55 A “no new garrisons” policy was reinforced by
the nonbinding Declaration of the Conduct of Parties
in the South China Sea (DOC) in which China and
all 10 ASEAN states agree to nonuse of force, peaceful settlements, and to refrain from further manning
unoccupied features.56 In the spirit of the DOC, and
despite the shortage of available real estate in the
Spratly Islands, no country has attempted to drive off
the troops of another country’s occupied base.57
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This relative acquiescence toward intermingled
military-occupied features has not extended to defending maritime and economic interests in the surrounding seas, however. The Dangerous Ground has lived
up to its name with numerous clashes and challenges
over the past several decades. The PRC, with its extensive claims and most capable naval and maritime civilian forces, has been the most involved against other
states’ vessels, beginning with far-ranging naval patrols in 1987 throughout most of the South China Sea,
protecting an area that China considers its “inherent
territories.”58 The most deadly Spratlys clash occurred
in 1988 when warships from the PLA Navy (PLAN)
and Vietnam People’s Navy (VPN) exchanged fire off
Johnson Reef South with each side sinking a vessel and
around 70 Vietnamese sailors lost.59 This fight began
a turbulent period in the South China Sea in which
military forces played a prominent (although less lethal) role. For instance, in April 1994, a Vietnamese
gunboat removed a Chinese research vessel from an
area claimed by both countries, and in July, the PLAN
blocked a Vietnamese-licensed oil rig.60 From 1992 to
1996, Taiwan reported 134 incidents of its fishing fleet
being boarded, harassed, detained, rammed, or fired
upon by PLAN vessels in the northern South China
Sea.61 Tensions started to calm in 1995, however, when
the PRC’s foreign minister attended the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Naval ships from all of the states
have subsequently played a more subdued role in
these waters.62
Instead of its navy, China has since used its maritime law enforcement ships to protect its claims, although backed by the PLAN which often shadows
just over the horizon.63 Five disparate PRC maritime
enforcement agencies64 have aggressively policed Chi-
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na’s interests, and kept tensions high throughout the
South China Sea. In 2013, the Chinese government consolidated four of these agencies into a single paramilitary coast guard under a new National Oceanic Administration, creating an “’iron fist’ that would replace
ineffective operations scattered among a number of
agencies.”65 This streamlining may only partially rein
in the aggressive nature of Chinese patrolling, since
other ministries within China have conflicting views
on the South China Sea disputes with the “policy of reactive assertiveness, characterized by strong reactions
to provocations by other parties” still being practiced
after the reorganization.66 Whereas, before the consolidation only the Maritime Police agency was armed, in
the new expanded coast guard, all of its vessels will
be armed, increasing significantly the weaponry available.67 In 2009, the PRC’s South Sea Region Fisheries
Administration Bureau detained 33 Vietnamese ships,
and seven in 2010.68 In one of five such incidents near
Reed Bank in early 2011, two China Marine Surveillance ships aggressively maneuvered against a Philippine seismic survey ship, forcing it to leave the area.
In May 2011, the Vietnamese claimed that a China Marine Surveillance ship cut the cables of a PetroVietnam
oil and gas survey ship in disputed waters near Vietnam, and in June a Chinese fishing vessel intentionally
rammed the exploration cables of another Vietnamese
survey ship.69 Just north of the Spratly Islands around
Scarborough Shoal, a protracted 2-month standoff
between PRC and Philippine vessels started in April
2012 over rights to enforce fishery resource rules that
blocked vessels and increased already taut tensions.70
Although events involving naval vessels have subsided, the level of police and commercial vessel incidents
has increased as a result of China tripling its patrols at
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sea since 2008.71 Some incidents have been attributed
to Chinese fishing vessels, which can be an auxiliary
to enforcement agencies as demonstrated in the 2012
Scarborough Shoal incident.72 These pose different
but serious problems because civilian vessels have
been “easier to deploy, operate under looser chains of
command, and engage more readily in skirmishes.”73
The U.S. Pacific Fleet Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and Information, speaking at a conference in a
personal capacity, recently warned that the PLAN is
using its civilian proxies for “Maritime confrontations
[that] haven’t been happening close to the Chinese
mainland. Rather, China is negotiating for control of
other nations’ resources off their coasts.”74 “It is a brilliant strategy by China to establish their control over
an area without firing a single shot,” observed Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, head of the Beijing office of the
International Crisis Group.75 PRC vessels have been
active in enforcing China’s maritime claims in the
South China Sea, exacerbating the tensions among the
states involved.
As the Scarborough Shoal standoff shows, numerous incidents are also initiated by the ASEAN claimants. For example, during the especially contentious
period of the 1990s, the Philippine Navy sank a Chinese fishing boat in 1993; a Malaysian patrol boat fired
on a Chinese trawler in 1995, injuring four men; and
in 1999, Philippine naval vessels twice bumped Chinese fishing boats, all taking place in disputed areas.76
Military incidents among the ASEAN states are rare,
but one occurred in 1976 when Vietnamese forces on
its then main garrison on Southwest Cay fired on a
Philippines aircraft that flew too close, although without effect.77 Another confrontation almost occurred in
1999 when aircraft from the Philippines and Malaysia
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“nearly engaged” over Malaysian controlled Investigator Shoal—although both afterwards dismissed the
incident in more ASEAN-like conciliatory fashion.78
Under civilian authorities, incidents occur with “Increasingly assertive positions among claimants [that]
have pushed regional tensions to new heights.”79 Examples in this monograph have offered only a few
of many altercations in contested waters consisting
of Malaysian intervention against Philippine and
Vietnamese fishing boats, Philippine actions against
Vietnamese and Malaysian vessels, and Vietnamese enforcement of its claims against the others.80 All
have also forcibly reacted against Chinese commercial
vessels as well.81 Since 1989, more than 300 incidents
against Chinese trawlers have been reported, including being fired upon, seized, or expelled, with 10 ships
detained by the Vietnamese in 2010, for example.82 Despite the many disputes among ASEAN states in the
South China Sea, however, there have been very few
casualties among them—in contrast to clashes with
the PRC.83 As a relative lull in naval and police actions
in the South China Sea during the 2000s seems to be
ending, some analysts fear that a major discovery of
energy resources could fan the flames of more serious
clashes in a region lacking the mechanisms for conflict management.84 The International Crisis Group
observes, “While the likelihood of major conflict remains low, all of the trends are in the wrong direction, and prospects of resolution are diminishing.”85
Those assessments bode poorly for the region’s states
and for the United States, which also has significant
interests there.
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Importance of the Spratly Region
to the United States.
In addition to the South China Sea region holding
huge potential for producing oil and natural gas, it
is also one of the world’s great thoroughfares of energy and trade, and thus of immense importance to
the United States and the international community.
The United Nations (UN) Conference on Trade and
Development estimated that 8.4 million tons of maritime trade, more than half of the world’s annual total,
passed into the South China Sea in 2010. The USEIA
estimates that around 6 tcf of natural gas, over half of
the world’s maritime gas movement, was part of that
trade, as was approximately 14 trillion barrels of oil, or
a third of the world’s volume.86 These massive movements link energy rich southwest Asia and northern
Africa to economically vibrant northeast Asia. An estimated 80 percent of Taiwanese, 66 percent of South
Korean, and 60 percent of Japanese energy supplies
are imported via the South China Sea, which also accounts for 40 percent of Japan’s total exports and imports.87 These busiest shipping lanes in the world pass
by either side of the centrally placed Spratly Islands,88
and their security is crucial to nearby states with
which the United States has a range of formal defense
arrangements including Taiwan, South Korea, Japan,
Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore.89
Economic development in East Asia and the world
would be seriously set back should maritime trade in
the South China Sea be disrupted.90 The PRC, ROC,
and Vietnam each claim all of the Spratly Islands and
most of the South China Sea, and these conflicting and
extensive maritime claims also challenge U.S. economic interests to exploit water column and seabed
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resources on what many parties consider high seas or
international waters.91 U.S. economic interests are directly and indirectly entwined in the competition over
the distant Spratly Islands.
As this monograph has shown, this region is not
just another global hot spot, but one with important
long-term economic, territorial, and security contentions. That makes it not just one of the world’s most
disputed ocean areas, but also one of the few where
violent incidents routinely occur at sea.92 For diplomatic, historic, and military capacity reasons, other
states rely on the United States to ensure stability in
the South China Sea.93 This dependence could make
the Spratlys a convenient arena in which a rising China may test U.S. political will and dominance through
increasingly assertive incidents to which the United
States must respond to protect partner and American
security and economic interests.94 A senior fellow at
the Atlantic Council observed that:
Some in China may have believed that the global financial crisis that started in late 2007 signaled the decline of the U.S. and that the time was ripe to become
more assertive.95

Thus the United States may face the difficult dilemma of balancing its interests in support of allies
and partners with protecting its political and economic
relations with the PRC.96 For these reasons, American
journalist and Stratfor analyst Robert Kaplan dubbed
the South China Sea the world’s “new central theater
of conflict,” and “the heart of political geography in
coming decades.”97 Yet mutual economic and political dependence among all of these states, and with the
United States, argues against major conflict or even
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a Cold War-style rivalry.98 Each state with interests
in the South China Sea also understands the cooperative need for stability, sustainable management of
resources, freedom of navigation, crime prevention,
and a host of other common interests in the region
which cannot be attained by force alone.99 Indeed, the
United States and PRC signed an agreement in 1998
entitled “Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to
Strengthen Military Maritime Safety” (or the Military
Maritime Consultative Agreement [MMCA]) to prevent incidents between them.100 Nonetheless, concerns
remain that strong motivations, existing tensions, and
entrenched positions need only an accident or miscommunication to create an incident or open conflict
that subjugates all of these interests.101 Another reason
why the South China Sea is important to the United
States is that such incidents already occur.
Although ostensibly neutral and not a part of any
of the land or maritime claims in the South China Sea,
the United States and other seafaring states do have
international rights in the area which have been challenged in contentious ways—the legal bases for which
are explained in the next section. The comprehensive
claims by the PRC to all of the waters of the South China Sea, and its government’s interpretation of international law, encourages the Chinese to bar any activity by foreign military vessels and aircraft from what
most other states determine to be high seas and transitable Chinese maritime jurisdictions.102 Some analysts
believe that U.S. surveillance actions in the northern
South China Sea, which China contends trespass on
its jurisdiction, risks drawing the United States into a
conflict in the region.103 Although this concern is now
based on events in proximity to Chinese mainland waters, should the PRC prevail in its claims to land fea-
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tures and waters around the Spratly Islands, the entire
South China Sea could become a Chinese lake off-limits to foreign government vessels without permission.
Despite the deconfliction efforts of the 1998 MMCA,
aggressive incidents have occurred between Chinese
vessels and U.S. craft exercising freedom of navigation rights. The most serious incident was the 2001
collision of a Chinese fighter jet with a U.S. Navy EP-3
which killed the Chinese pilot, and forced the American crew to an emergency landing at the Chinese base
on Hainan Dao.104 On the surface, harassment by Chinese vessels has occurred against the U.S. ocean surveillance fleet, including the U.S. Naval Ships (USNS)
Bowditch (2001 and 2002), Bruce C. Heezen (2003), Victorious (2003 and 2004), Effective (2004), John McDonnell
(2005), Mary Sears (2005), Loyal (2005), and Impeccable
(2009).105 During this last incident, five Chinese vessels
surrounded the hydrographic survey ship roughly 75
miles southeast of Hainan Dao, and attempted to snag
its towing cable, to which the U.S. Navy responded by
dispatching warships to escort subsequent unarmed
survey and ocean surveillance vessels.106 While this
monograph went to print in December 2013, a renewed round of tensions seem to have started with
the PRC establishing an air defense identification zone
(ADIZ) over disputed islands in the East China Sea
with the establishment of a similar ADIZ expected in
the South China Sea, and a near-collision incident between the USS Cowpens and escort vessels of the PRC’s
Liaoning carrier battle group in disputed international waters of the South China Sea.107 Even if the United
States held absolute neutrality among the disputants,
it might still be drawn into the South China Sea fracas
to reinforce its maritime rights guaranteed under international law.
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LEGAL BASIS AND CLAIMS IN THE SPRATLY
ISLANDS SCRUM
What is the cause for this melee over land sovereignty, maritime jurisdiction, assertion of international rights, and police and military incidents around the
Spratly Islands? To best understand the issues and in
order to better contribute to their solution, this section analyzes customary (or traditional) law which
governs disputes over sovereignty of land and some
forms of maritime jurisdiction and rights, and the
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
which only addresses maritime issues, but in a more
comprehensive and coherent manner.108 This section
also examines how each of the involved parties applies these concepts to support its contentious claims.
In this section, disputes over land sovereignty are
generally treated distinctly from maritime jurisdiction
disputes, although either claim may depend upon the
legal standing of the other and may blur together in
the case of historic claims, as will be shown.109 Sovereignty determination over geologic features, boundary delimitation of maritime borders, and the nature
of those features as productive islands or uninhabitable rocks are three crucial decisions over which the
claimants contest.110 Concepts here are covered to the
depth needed to apply to the Spratly Islands and are
not meant to be comprehensive. Complicating such an
examination are the facts that international law is neither complete nor rigorous enough to be “a constitution” to consider the full merit of competing claims,111
and some modern legal regimes may conflict with
customary precepts.112 Thus legal applications may
not be the ultimate arbiter to resolve the many differences, but knowing the bases of these legal claims
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may better guide potential ways to manage multilateral disputes as they arise.113 In large part, these legal
disputes are how the contenders present their claims,
so examining them this way is useful to illustrate the
issues involved.
Customary International Laws and Claims.
Although by themselves the land features of the
Spratly Islands have sustained no human population
and produced little economically, they are points of
contention because an island may garner legal jurisdiction and control over adjoining waters and resources.114 To establish these benefits, a state uses customary, or traditional, international law to stake its
claim through long association in a historic claim or
discovery and occupation of a feature—each a separate mechanism to establish sovereignty but which
some states employ together like overlapping insurance policies. Once sovereignty is determined, the
type of feature owned dictates the forms of maritime
jurisdictions that may then extend from it.115 Customary law has evolved over the centuries, like common
law, mainly from European traditions based on generally accepted notions, or past precedence through
agreements, arbitration, or rulings by international
courts. Concepts in customary law evolve as state
practices change, and tend to address only specific issues presented within certain contexts. Among Asian
societies Western customary legal concepts like sovereignty, the high seas, or coastal jurisdiction have no
traditional equivalent which makes adjudicating ancient claims incongruent with modern procedures.116
Socialist governments around the South China Sea
also assert that “Bourgeois international law serves
the interests of the bourgeoisie only,” although they
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employ these methods to advance their interests even
as they seek to change them.117 Customary law is also
not codified and agreed upon in as rigorous a manner
as UNCLOS, all of which leaves traditional law exceedingly complex and open to many interpretations
and differences in its application.118
UNCLOS purposefully does not address sovereignty over land and “is premised on the assumption
that a particular state has undisputed title over territory from which the maritime zone is claimed.”119 Thus
customary law is the usual means to settle sovereignty
disputes over territory through international law (of
course other means exist like conquest or purchase),
and its maritime customs are still sometimes invoked
today as well. UNCLOS has indirectly spurred island
claims since its negotiations began in the 1970s by assigning oceanic jurisdiction to nearly any land feature,
thereby converting previously avoided desolate rock
obstacles into the focal points of potential oceanic
riches, and igniting a form of gold rush in the Spratly
Islands. There are a few cases where territorial sovereignty claims are pressed through UNCLOS as well.
Along with new technologies and rapidly expanding
populations and economic needs, the new Law of the
Sea Treaty explains why island disputes have turned
more serious and violent in the South China Sea since
the 1970s and why we study old legal principles to
understand a 21st-century problem.120
Historic Vietnamese and Chinese Claims under
Customary Law.
The oldest method of establishing jurisdiction over
the features and waters of the South China Sea is to
claim “historic rights,” “historic waters,” or “historic
title” to them. In essence this concept states that an
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area has been part of a state, through long continuous
administrative control, economic use, or social links,
which should give the claimant special consideration
for inherent usage rights in the area; or as its internal
waters or sovereign territory when the claim is generally recognized by other states.121 The appeal of maintaining a doctrine of historic claims comes from the legal principle of stare decisis (“maintain what has been
decided,” or settled law) offering the advantage of stability and continuity in law and governance, which is
why it was accepted as a precept by the International
Court of Justice in 1951.122 In contrast, in traditional
East Asian politics before Western legal concepts were
practiced, a historic association of a region to a people
or state would preclude the need for a formal legal
claim to perennially oversee or control it.123
Although a practical customary precept, even in
Western international law historic claims are broad
and not well-defined traditionally or in the Law of the
Sea Treaty.124 Generally, historic rights recognize that
traditional activities may continue in a designated
area, or, if specifically stated, may also include a claim
to a land area or maritime jurisdiction.125 The concept
of historic claims “over which a nation exercises sovereign authority,” has been occasionally noted “under
international law in limited situations,” but the ambiguity of these concepts’ wide ranging and sometimes
conflicting interpretations mean they may not be useful mechanisms for establishing control.126 Nonetheless, when such claims are made they are accompanied
by detailed historic documentation to build a case in
favor of the claimant which would then need to be
verified and weighed against other conflicting claims.
Such procedures favor cultures with long traditions
in writing and record keeping. Using this mechanism
to establish sovereignty or jurisdiction under modern
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practices requires that claims be backed by effective,
continuous, and unchallenged occupation or administration to be valid.127 These latter criteria are usually
hard to establish, and thus may account in part for
the past and present practice of challenging or ejecting nonsubject people from disputed areas in order to
demonstrate some control over the claims,128 resulting
in some of the violent incidents this monograph has
documented.
In the Spratly Islands region, there are two conflicting historic claims made by three parties: the PRC,
ROC, and Vietnam, with the PRC and ROC sharing
mutually supporting identical claims.129 Vietnam
presents a classic historic case for all of the Spratly
and Paracel Islands, and an undelimitated amount of
most of the South China Sea built on four historical
arguments presented in three White Papers in 1979,
1982, and 1988.130 As evidence, Vietnam presents historic records and maps showing it was the first state
to discover and name the Spratlys, using court documents from as early as the reign of King Le Tanh Tong
(1460-97), and “that the ‘Feudal Vietnamese State’
effectively controlled the two archipelagoes since
the 17th century according to international law.”131
Vietnam also invokes the 1884 French claim and administration over the Spratlys while the Vietnamese
states were a French protectorate and ultimate successor to their Western legal-style claim.132 After it gained
independence, a modern Vietnamese scholar could
assert that:
a long time ago, regional countries pursued their
normal activities in the East Sea133 without encountering any Chinese impediment and they have never
recognized China’s historic rights in the South China
Sea. . . .134
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More archival records are being translated into
English to bolster Vietnam’s historic claim to the
entire region.135
The Vietnamese historic claim to any of the Spratly Islands tends to be inconclusive, however. Many
non-Vietnamese scholars have found that basic Vietnamese knowledge about the Spratly Islands in its
historic documents was weak and depended much on
conveyed European misperceptions of the region.136
When more accurate information about the Spratlys
was attained by Vietnamese authorities “there is little
evidence that the Nguyen dynasty [1802-1945] upheld
its claim through declarations, effective occupation, or
utilization.”137
The Vietnamese claim has not been generally recognized, having been ignored in the 1951 peace conference in San Francisco in which Japan relinquished
control of the islands after World War II; and the claim
has been consistently protested and interfered with
by other states since the 1950s.138 Other telling blows
were official statements by the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam’s (North Vietnam) Second Foreign Minister
in 1956 and Prime Minister in 1958 that recognized the
PRC’s stated territorial claims which included both the
Paracel and Spratly Islands, even while acknowledging disagreements over their land border. That same
government today renounces the earlier support to
PRC territorial claims as a necessity during their wars
against foreigners,139 but such recent recantations cannot help underscore a weak historic claim that is difficult
to support.
The Chinese claim to the South China Sea and its
geologic features is even more extensive than that of
the Vietnamese,140 but is just as ill-defined. Whether
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China claims all of the sea and resources of the region, as indicated in terms officially used like “territorial waters”; just the Spratlys and other land features
within the South China Sea, as may be intended with
assertions to “historic title”; unspecified traditional
rights in the region, like fishing, or some combination
of these; they are voraciously defended as “historically
belonging to China,” and “China’s intrinsic and inseparable territories” under the historic claim doctrine.141
Chinese records show use of the sea that date to the
Tang (618-907) and Song (960-1279) dynasties when
a “Marine Silk Route” to Arabia and Africa developed.142 Political oversight of the Spratly Islands may
have started during the Yuan dynasty (1271-1368),
and economic activities like fishing followed during
the Ming dynasty (1368-1644).143 Chinese association
with the Spratlys is better documented from the mid1800s through artifacts, trading records, refuge for
nomadic fisherman, and diplomatic interactions with
European powers or policing actions against them.144
For instance, in 1876 China’s ambassador to Great
Britain declared the Paracel Islands as Chinese territory, and in 1883 the Chinese expelled a German survey team on the Spratly Islands.145 To clarify its heretofore rather inconsistent claims against other powers
in the South China Sea, a Chinese committee on land
and water boundaries published a document in 1935
listing 96 land features above low tide level as Chinese
territory.146 In 1947, the ROC consolidated the Chinese
historic claim by publishing a map with its “traditional maritime boundary line” (more often referred to as
the “9-dashed line” or “U-shaped line,” see Map 1) enclosing most of the South China Sea waters and associated land features as its “indisputable sovereignty.”147
The 1948 announcement that followed to explain the
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claim was purposely vague as to what was actually
claimed , whether all the waters, just its land features,
unspecified rights in the region like use of the sea bed,
or some combination of these—an ambiguity that
both Chinese governments have continued to maintain.148 The Chinese claim their historic links to the
Spratlys were well recognized until the 1930s when
the French made claim to them through their then colonial possession of Tonkin (northern Vietnam), and
the Japanese annexed them during World War II. In
support, the Chinese cite an 1887 Sino-French treaty in
which all islands east of a delimitation line belonged
to China. Both the Spratly and Paracel Islands lie east
of this line, although neither was specifically named,
and the French would later contest that the treaty was
a local agreement and not one of such wide scope.149
Despite Chinese documentation claiming the
Spratlys, there are problems with its arguments because Chinese association with them has often lacked
the clear consistent claims or effective administration required by modern international judgments.150
Although not itself strong because it suffers from
the same flaws, Vietnam’s historic claim nonetheless
contests China’s assertions to acquiescence by other
states and that it has been a victim of European imperial aggression. Vietnam, for instance, refuses to
stamp new PRC passports bearing a map showing the
South China Sea as part of China, and has opposed an
annual May-to-August fishing ban in the South China
Sea imposed by China.151 Non-Chinese scholars also
note that other competing claims for some or all of
the Spratly islands have been made since the 1800s by
France, Britain, and Japan, pushing China into asserting formal Western legal style sovereignty claims.152
As already shown, more recent claims by the Philip-
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pines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei demonstrate
that other states have not recognized China’s claims,
and China has not sufficiently maintained continuous
or effective control.
Chinese counterarguments that its sovereignty
over the Spratlys was strong until French incursions
in the 1930s, are viewed dimly in light of inconsistent
claims and the weak exercise of authority up to the
end of World War II. For instance, an official Chinese
report from 1928 delineates the Paracel Islands as China’s southern border, and did not include the Spratly
Islands.153 During the 1943 Cairo Conference among
the belligerents fighting Japan, attending ROC President Chiang Kai-shek made no claims for any Japanese occupied territory in the Spratlys, despite the fact
that decisions about occupied lands was a main topic
of the conference. As noted earlier, the ROC also withdrew troops landed there after World War II in 1950
and these were not replaced until 1956; and the PRC
attempted no control of the islets until 1988. Also, during the 1951 negotiations over the peace treaty with
Japan, 46 of 50 participating countries rejected a Soviet
call to assign the Japanese conquered areas, including
the Spratlys and Paracels, to the PRC.154 A senior intelligence officer at the U.S. Pacific Fleet in a personal capacity challenged Chinese historic claims even further
when he declared in 2013 that the claims were:
the rubric of a maritime history that is not only contested in the international community but has largely
been fabricated by Chinese government propaganda
bureaus in order to . . . ‘educate’ the populace about
China’s rich maritime history.155

Chinese and Vietnamese officials have shown
historic use of the southern South China Sea and its
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features but not to the level needed to establish effective control and thus sovereignty, since other states
were also using and claiming parts of this area during
these periods.156 Some commentators believe China
and Vietnam might have more success by converting
their claims to one of historic rights to things like fishing, which are better documented historic activities by
both in the region.157 In short, the Chinese and Vietnamese historic claims for control over the Spratly Islands and their surrounding waters “can generally be
summarized as incomplete, intermittent, and unconvincing.”158 Widely accepted international precedents,
like the Island of Palmas Case ruled by the Permanent
Court of Arbitration in 1925 and in subsequent cases,159
find effective administration and occupation of land
take precedence over first discovery, historic claims,
or close proximity.160 The Vietnamese and Chinese
historic claims to the Spratly Islands lack a sufficient
weight of evidence to establish the requirements of
persistent effective control by their respective governments, sustainable population, or enduring economic
activity with the Islands sufficient to clearly establish
sovereignty or rights to specific activities.161
Sovereign Claims under the Customary Law of Discovery
and Occupation.
More in accord with modern customary legal precepts, because it is centered on effective control, is the
customary legal principle of discovery and occupation. China, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia
have each staked out some or all of the Spratly Islands
using this method. Like historic claims, which are increasingly being held to the same modern standard
of effective administration, land stakes made through
discovery and occupation require that a first claim be
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made for a land feature and then consistently and effectively controlled to remain valid.162 This land must
previously be res nullis (“nobody’s property”),163 and
thus “discovered,” and open for occupation and exploitation. More important is the “subsequent continuous and effective acts of occupation, generally construed to mean permanent settlement,” although for
uninhabitable islands that standard may be less strict
but then garners fewer jurisdictional rights, as will
be covered in the next section.164 In the indeterminate
nature of historic claim law, one could argue that historic claims fall under the doctrine of discovery and
occupation through long-term association, although
the difference in evidence presented, time frames, and
inclusion of historic waters or rights may make them
separate types of claims which are often how the parties to the Spratly Island disputes present them. In the
South China Sea some formal discovery and occupation claims started in the 1800s, but many now cited
originated after 1945 when defeated Japan renounced
its World War II annexations leaving a void in ownership, and arguably resetting all the geologic features
to res nullis. As examined below, each party derives its
claim through discovery and occupation differently,
but the evolving requirement for effective control and
habitation accounts for the sudden interest in occupying the land features of the Spratly Islands (mainly
through military garrisons so far) from which the occupying party would then seek to establish sovereignty over some or all of the islets.165
In addition to its historic claim, as well as supporting it, China also asserts that “Beijing has indisputable
sovereignty over the islands based on discovery and
prior occupation” as PRC President Yan Shang Kun
declared in 1991.166 Under its modern application, discovery and occupation of the Spratly Islands began
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in 1946 after ROC President Chiang Kai-shek ordered
the occupation of Itu Aba and followed this with the
publication of the infamous U-shaped line claim to the
South China Sea.167 Despite an interruption of its occupation from 1950-56 after losing the Chinese Civil
War, Taiwan continued to assert its claim over the
archipelago based on the 1952 Sino-Japanese Treaty
which recognized Chinese sovereignty over the Spratlys. However, Japan had previously renounced all
claims to the Spratlys, with no successor assigned, and
the 1951 San Francisco Treaty refused to recognize any
Spratly claims. Undeterred, Taiwan retorted that such
actions could not nullify its sovereignty grounded on
earlier historic claims and occupation.168 Taiwan, for
instance, extends its civilian control over Itu Aba as a
municipality that is part of Kaohsiung’s Cijin District,
and it has its own postal code.169 Bracketing the ROC’s
early single occupation are the much later occupations
by the PRC to the same claims starting in 1988 when it
established a physical PLA presence in the archipelago. This late occupation was preceded by much earlier
discovery claims to all of the Spratlys by the PRC in
1951, and maritime rights from these features in 1958.
Administrative control was furthered under PRC laws
passed in 1992 and 1998 specifying Chinese maritime
jurisdiction and rights,170 and with the incorporation
in July 2012 of Sansha, located on the Paracel’s Woody
Island, as the administrative prefecture-level city for
all of its South China Sea claims including the Spratly
Islands.171 Physical possession of its seven features is
crucial to supporting its claim, as demonstrated when
the Philippines vacated and subsequently lost Mischief Reef to PLA occupation in 1995 as part of China’s
final acquisition in the Spratlys.172
Just as the shared PRC and ROC historic claim has
been vigorously contested, so too have their discovery
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and occupation claims for many of the same reasons.
After World War II, France also sent an expedition to
the Spratlys to contest the Chinese occupation and reestablish its claims, although the French did not leave
a physical presence.173 Not only have Chinese claims
to the Spratlys been contested by other states since
they were first made under discovery and occupation,
but its interrupted and limited control over the islands
have not supported China’s extensive claims. Taiwan
occupies only Itu Aba as its sole garrison in the Spratlys (and for 12 years the only one among all the disputants). It did so based on its understanding of customary law that, by occupying the major land feature
in a group, control over the other associated features
was assumed.174 This practice has not been honored
by the other parties. The PRC’s administrative control
activities only started during the 1970s followed by its
first physical occupation after all other claimants.175
The PRC delayed its opportunity for effective control
while turned inward during divisive political movements and modernization, allowing Vietnam, the
Philippines, and Malaysia a 30-year lead in discovery
and effective occupation through permanent outposts
and structures built on previously vacant Spratly features.176 Chinese actions have been routinely disputed
by other states, such as when Sansha City was established incorporating all of its South China Sea claims
into the PRC’s municipal system, with Vietnam and
the Philippines expectedly protesting but so did, unusually, the United States.177 Aggressive PRC actions
in the South China Sea since the Sansha City disputes
may in part be to make up for the appearance of weak
administration over the Spratlys by asserting control
through more enforcement of its national laws to show
it sufficiently governs them as part of its jurisdiction.

32

Since Vietnam’s historic claim to the Spratly Islands
is no stronger than China’s longer and more documented evidence, Vietnamese officials have instead
gradually emphasized the principle of discovery and
occupation claiming that the archipelago was res nullis
before 1933. In reality, the original claim began in 1884
when France established a protectorate over Vietnam
along with both the Paracel and Spratly Islands.178 In
1930, wary of Japanese expansion in East Asia, France
consummated its earlier discovery by annexing Spratly Island and 3 years later claimed all of the Spratleys
and occupied, for the first time, nine islets until they
were, in turn, occupied by Japan between 1937 and
1938.179 As the legal successor to French claims based
from the Vietnamese protectorate, Vietnam asserts it
subsequently assumed this claim to the Spratlys when
it gained divided independence in 1954.180 However,
South Vietnamese attempts at effective administration
followed much later in 1974 when the Spratlys were
incorporated into Vietnam’s Phuoc Tuy province, and
off-shore oil exploration contracts were let.181 In 1975,
North Vietnam took control of South Vietnam’s recently established Spratly garrisons and claim (along
with the rest of the country), and placed additional
forces on other features, growing from 13 to 21 positions by 1997 and to 29 garrisons today.182 To assert its
control, Vietnam has since established Spratly Island
as a township in Truòng Sa district, organized local
elections and tours in the Spratlys, and has continued to award oil exploration contracts.183 Vietnam’s
claims to the Spratlys were formally delimitated in a
maritime law passed by the National Assembly in
June 2012.184
These acquired claims are difficult to substantiate
since the Chinese have routinely challenged all French
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and Vietnamese claims in the area, and, as noted earlier, North Vietnamese authorities during the 1950s officially supported the PRC claim to the Spratlys.185 Also,
neither France nor the then semi-independent Vietnam pressed their claim during the 6 years from 1950
to 1956 when the Spratlys were entirely unoccupied—
in part because both turned inward to address more
pressing domestic troubles and wished to remain in
good standing with China.186 Further condemning the
Vietnamese claim is that France asserts that it made its
claims to the Spratlys for itself rather than in the name
of Vietnam.187 In 1950, responsibility for the defense of
the Paracel Islands was transferred by the French to
the Vietnamese, with subsequent Vietnamese licensed
economic activity ensuing in the form of phosphate
mining.188 However, no such turnover occurred with
the Spratlys, and in 1956 both Vietnam and France
delivered separate protests to the Philippines government when citizens from that country claimed parts of
the Spratlys. However, in 1957 the French allowed its
Spratly Islands claim to go passive, neither relinquishing nor defending its claim, leaving the Vietnamese
inherited claim in limbo.189 Since then, the PRC, ROC,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei all have routinely contested the extensive Vietnamese claims to
most of the South China Sea in words and deeds of
their own. Despite its historic documentation, assertions of discovery, and assumption of French claims,
Vietnam’s stark physical possession of the many features in the Spratlys seems to be its strongest claim to
the region
With no historic claim of its own, the Philippines
relies on the principle of discovery and occupation,
and their close proximity, to claim nearly all of the
Spratly Islands, except Spratly Island itself and other
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points west of it.190 Filipino involvement in the Spratlys
was spurred by a private entrepreneur, Tomas Cloma,
who by 1950 established several colonies on the islets
to open a fish cannery and exploit guano deposits.191
With no official government action following, Cloma,
with his brother Filemon and encouragement from
the Philippine Vice President, formally claimed this
region as his own in 1956, and named it Kalaya’an
(Freedomland).192 Although these actions alarmed
the ROC government, which rushed to re-establish
its military presence on Itu Aba, the Philippines government only officially occupied five features in the
nearby Reed Bank area in 1971 after the prospects for
discovering oil were apparent. In 1978, the Philippines
occupied two more islets in the Spratlys, and formally
claimed the Kalaya’an Group, and incorporated it into
Palawan province, through Presidential Decree Number 1596.193 The Philippines government also based its
discovery and occupation on the features being res nullis and open to occupation after World War II. They interpret all earlier historic and occupation claims to the
Spratlys as void because based on the 1951 San Francisco Treaty the island group was “de facto under the
trusteeship of the Allied Powers” and thus “as ‘trusts’
nullified any previous ownership of them. . . .”194
With a clean slate, military occupation, and active
economic exploitation through fishing and drilling
for energy (even if no sustained economic activity on
the islets themselves), the Philippines government has
staked its claim to Kalaya’an through discovery and
effective occupation.
The Philippines’ stake in the Spratlys is, of course,
hotly disputed by other claimants. The Philippines
makes no historic claim to the Spratlys because the
Spanish-American treaty of 1898, which transferred
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possession of the Philippines to the United States,
explicitly established a western limit that excluded
the Spratlys. Upon Philippine independence in 1946,
American advisors discouraged Filipino claims to the
Spratlys based upon this treaty and to avoid conflict
with the ROC, a wartime ally.195 When Tomas Cloma
took private ownership of the islands in 1956, the ROC,
France, and independent South Vietnam protested
this action to the Philippine government.196 Each disputed that their previous claims were not abandoned
or null, and instead found Cloma’s claim invalid since
a private citizen may not claim land unless acting on
behalf of a sovereign state, and the Philippines government did not sanction his actions. As further evidence,
the Philippines did not include the nearby Kalaya’an
area within its straight line baselines that officially
declared the extent of the Philippine archipelago in
1955.197 Contiguous proximity to the Spratlys, as the
closest state adjacent to many of the Spratly features,
also does not strengthen the Filipino claim, since the
1925 Island of Palmas and subsequent cases established
effective occupation as the standard for possession—
not distance.198 The Philippines also waited 25 years
after they claimed the islands reverted to res nullis
before discovering and occupying any of them. Thus,
the Philippine claim is no stronger than the others,
and suffers from having no supporting claim through
historic or proximity arguments.
As Vietnam’s discovery and occupation claim to
its protector’s much earlier discovery was undercut by
subsequent French action, a potential Malaysian succession to an early discovery in the Spratlys was also
undercut by the British—forcing Malaysia to make a
separate and later claim of its own. The British were
probably the first Europeans to land in the Spratlys,
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and the archipelago is named after a British sailor.199
The first documented Western legal claim to the Spratlys was made in 1877 for Spratly Island and Amboyna
Cay by Britain based from its Labuan Crown Colony
in Borneo. During the 1880s, Britain’s Central Borneo
Company planned to gather guano commercially from
these islets, but operations may not have followed.200
These islets were included on the British Colonial Office List, although little more was done to perfect the
claim.201 In 1933, when the French pursued their Spratly claim more vigorously, the British allowed its claim
to go dormant, neither abandoning its own discovery
nor challenging the claims of others.202 Thus Malaysia
had to make its own discovery and occupation claim
after acquiring the northern Borneo states from Britain
in 1963. Malaysia’s discovery began in 1979 with the
official publication of a map claiming 12 Spratly features, with occupation following in 1983 at Swallow
Reef and subsequently four other features.203
Malaysia’s claims are also contested in full by
China, and in part by the Philippines and Vietnam.
In fact, Amboyna Cay, for which the British made a
claim in 1877, is currently occupied by Vietnamese
forces, and thus Malaysia has not demonstrated effective control over its claim.204 Malaysia has resolved its
overlapping differences in the South China Sea with
the enclave country of Brunei, however.205 Of all the
claimants, Malaysian diplomats are most effective at
reasonably resolving disputes. They have established
model agreements and bilateral joint development
zones with both Vietnam and Thailand in disputed
waters near peninsular Malaysia, and have submitted
a joint continental shelf claim in the South China Sea
with Vietnam.206 Nor does Malaysia claim all features
and waters that it could if it pressed its maritime stake
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to a line equidistant from its national shores meeting
in the middle similar claims for the Spratly Islands
drawn for other states. Malaysia also resolved its
South China Sea differences with Indonesia centered
on Natuna Basar by defining the two maritime borders
for peninsular and insular Malaysia. The Indonesian
agreement may have set a bad precedent for other Malaysian claims, however, since it accepted less control
over the disputed continental shelf than allowed under UNCLOS, with some commentators concluding
that in such moderate actions “Malaysia has undercut
its own potential claim to some extent. . . .”207
Under customary sovereignty law, historic ownership principles made by Vietnam and China are generally thought to be weak, and discovery and occupation
is fiercely contested, although effectively executed,
given the myriad examples cited here.208 Employing
traditional methods of establishing sovereignty over
the Spratlys has justified assertive actions that have
created tension and frustration, and at worst precarious standoffs and pitched battles that have killed.209
Because of these sometimes violent disputes, the potential riches of the South China Sea are squandered
through uncoordinated nonsustainable overuse in the
case of fishing, or nonuse through lack of investment
and development due to unstable political conditions
in the case of hydrocarbon energy. The Spratly Islands
have become a literal patchwork of intermingled seizures and occupations rendering confusing and overlapping potential maritime jurisdictions. Perhaps it is
not surprising that the customary law used by European states to build and fight over empires in North
America, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast
Asia would also lead to tension when applied in the
South China Sea. With the economic, political, and
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emotional issues involved, it may be highly unlikely
to reverse the many resulting physical military occupations in the Spratlys, and “very difficult, if not impossible, for China to negotiate the ‘return’ of those
islands” as Dr. Lai observes.210
These fixed positions of sovereignty may be a solution, although a messy one, to possession and exploitation of the Spratly Islands through adapting another
Roman based international customary law, uti possidetis (“as you possess, thus may you possess”). This
principle allows a party to maintain as its property
its current possession until its rightful owner is ascertained. In international law, that is interpreted to mean
land gained (often in war) remains with the occupier
unless otherwise disposed through a treaty. This principle was upheld by the International Court of Justice
in 1986 when it ruled to maintain the colonial borders
inherited by independent states in the case Burkina
Faso vs. Mali.211 This law could apply to the Spratly Islands if the claimants kept their present possessions,
under whatever method they were gained, unless a
subsequent formal settlement is negotiated. However,
this arrangement could lead to disputes and violence
as the many yet unprocessed features, rocks, reefs and
even underwater geologic protrusions, are snatched
and occupied in a new “land rush” melee. This is an
expensive and dangerous solution fraught with many
perils of which the claimants should be wary, especially since not all parties may continue to adhere to
the present consensus that garrisons in place remain
undisturbed. Further conflict for possessions thus
could occur following the lead of the great European
imperial powers, with the strongest imposing its will
on the others.
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United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea and Spratly Claims.
Should the problem of sovereignty over each or all
of the Spratly Islands be resolved, the issue of what is
gained in the maritime realm through their possession
is the province of UNCLOS. The U.S. position on this
issue was revealed by then Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton in 2010 at the ARF:
We believe claimants should pursue their territorial
claims and accompanying rights to maritime space
in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea. Consistent with customary international law,
legitimate claims to maritime space in the South China
Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to
land features.212

The issue of sovereignty is so central that some
South China Sea claimants argue for the possession of
land features using UNCLOS, although that is explicitly not its stated purpose. Land claims through UNCLOS are sometimes made when other claims through
customary law seem weak or because of the perception that claims made through UNCLOS may have
higher standing in the eyes of the international community. Because of the importance of UNCLOS, this
section discusses its key points that affect the Spratly
region dispute, including how maritime jurisdiction is
determined when originating from a land feature, the
different maritime zones and their rights, and the sea
and land claims that the South China Sea disputants
have lodged using these rules.
Well-defined maritime boundaries and agreed
upon rights within them are necessary to peace and
stability on the ocean commons.213 Customary mari40

time law, through most of history, governed space,
and actions on the seas by allocating 3-mile-wide
territorial waters from a coast, with general agreement on rights for navigation and taking of resources.
Since the 1950s, however, management of the sea has
become much more regulated and comprehensive
through a series of international treaties culminating
in UNCLOS (also known as the Law of the Sea Treaty), which was negotiated from 1973 to 1982 and took
effect in 1994. This treaty gives coastal states a 12-nm
territorial sea, and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
of limited economic control to 200-nm from the coast,
and possibly a continental shelf extension to the natural limit of its seabed shelf (to a maximum of 350-nm).
It also has provisions for archipelagic states to enclose
the waters around and between their islands as internal waters giving more economic and security control
within their physically fragmented countries.214 These
maritime boundaries of state control are premised on
the type of land feature each emanates from (inhabitable land or unproductive rock), so that the issues of
sovereignty, topography, and classification of a land
feature determines maritime boundaries.215
Each of the states claiming the Spratlys has ratified
this convention, although often with reservations. Taiwan, however, is not eligible to be a member, although
it generally follows its rules, and the United States
has signed but not ratified the treaty.216 Technically,
UNCLOS does not apply to disputes started before it
came into effect, including all of the Spratly claims,
but an expectation exists for signatories to abide by
its provisions nonetheless.217 Four forms of settlement
are offered by UNCLOS for dispute resolution, with
arbitration the assumed form since none of the states
involved have yet chosen a method. States are able to

41

opt out of some of the Law of the Sea Treaty’s requirements. The PRC and the other claimant states, for instance, do not accept compulsory procedures to settle
disputes over maritime boundaries, military or legal
activities in a zone, or actions of the Security Council,
because those provisions might interfere with the discretionary sovereign powers of the state.218 Thus UNCLOS is a well-respected treaty that offers guidance to
resolve disputes like those found in the South China
Sea, but rarely does so through strict enforcement.219
Determination of a Habitable Island from a Rock.
After designating sovereignty over a land feature,
which is normally deemed beyond the pale of UNCLOS, determining the type of feature from which a
maritime zone is claimed is the next step and one of
the functions of the law of the sea. Inhabitable lands
receive full consideration of all UNCLOS maritime
zones and rights, although these can be constrained
by surrounding zones. Continental states receive this
full consideration for territorial waters and adjacent
EEZ or continental shelf, while islands may be assigned some or all of those areas.220 However, what
constitutes an inhabitable island is a major concern
since a qualified speck of land could accrue control
over 125,000 nm2 of water column and seabed through
the UNCLOS regime. Under Article 121:
an island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide [,but] . . .
Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or
economic life of their own shall have no exclusive
economic zone or continental shelf.221
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The human considerations in the island definition
establishes a sub-class of islands known as “rocks”
which are “barren and uninhabitable insular formations, such as cays and atolls,” and receive only territorial waters and a contiguous zone around them
regardless of the size of the rocks.222
Respected Spratly Island experts Mark Valencia,
Jon Van Dyke, and Noel Ludwig have determined
that 25 to 35 features in the region “are above water at
high tide, and these qualify as islands . . . and appear
to be entitled to territorial seas.”223 They also note, per
Article 121, that reefs and other features submerged at
high tide garner no maritime zones “even if artificial
structures are based on them,” except for a 500-meter
safety zone given to any artificial or temporary feature at sea.224 Under these terms, some of the PRC’s
current Spratly occupations might garner no maritime
zones since they are perched upon submerged reefs,
which may also pertain to some of the other countries’
occupations like Malaysia’s Swallow Reef, Vietnam’s
Barque Canada Reef, and the Philippine’s Commodore Reef.225 In 1975, the International Court of Justice
advised that the standard for formal displays of sovereignty, like markers and policing, are lower for uninhabited areas, which would also pertain to islands
designated as rocks.226 This monograph has deliberately not used the word “island” indiscriminately,
in order to accurately distinguish features as used by
these various definitions.
Because the stakes are high for how a maritime
land feature is designated and the definitions used in
UNCLOS are not precise, leeway is often employed
to interpret this clause. Whereas physical geography
may distinguish between an island and a nonisland
geologic feature, human needs distinguish between
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a habitable island and a rock. The key question then
is, “What does it take to sustain human habitation or
have economic life of its own?”227 A source of indigenous potable water might be one criterion, but would
that prevent a solar powered desalinization plant from
also fulfilling the requirement for “human habitation
. . . on their own?” Must the island itself sustain its
population with the necessities of life to be habitable,
or may it be supplied from outside? Are lighthouses
or navigation markers sufficient evidence of “economic life of their own”?228 Van Dyke has argued cogently
that a habitable island requires a permanent sustainable population “who are on the land area for reasons
other than just to secure a claim of a distant population for the adjacent ocean resources.” He explicitly
discounts occupation forces and lighthouse keepers
from this group.229 He further believes, with other experts, that a population of at least 50 people could constitute a sufficiently stable community to satisfy the
habitation requirement, although he has conceded:
The criterion may not inevitably require that the insular feature itself be permanently inhabited, but it
would require, at a minimum, that it provide support
for a regular basis by fisheries from neighboring islands. . . .230

The indeterminate nature of the habitable criterion
leaves much room for the claimants and experts to argue and disagree.
Under some circumstances, rocks and inhabited
islands may not receive full maritime zones.231 Rocks
receive little consideration under international law
to prevent them from impinging on similar rights of
nearby islands or continents that are populous and
economically active, to not interfere with opportuni44

ties that should be open to all seafaring nations when
located on the high seas, and to reduce the incentive
to “reverse engineer” a barren feature with a settlement that could claim a maritime zone that would
make the feature economically viable when it was not
originally.232 Even habitable islands hold lesser status
under UNCLOS when compared against the claims
of a continental coast. In the 1984 International Court
of Justice case between Libya and Malta, the latter
was given:
a diminished capacity to generate maritime zones in
comparison to the broad coastline of Libya . . . thus
even substantial and heavily populated islands are not
the equivalent of continental landmasses in their ability to support claims over adjacent ocean space.233

Another example of a similar application pertinent
to the Spratly Islands is that uninhabitable islands
generating territorial waters would not impede the
rest of the rights attributed to a larger maritime zone,
like an EEZ, that may encompass it.234 This would apply, for instance, to Mischief Reef which, if it were
found to at least meet the status of a rock, would generate territorial waters for the PRC within the Philippine’s EEZ, and with Amboyna Cay for Vietnam’s
occupation within Malaysia’s EEZ. The vague considerations that are taken into account in determining
maritime boundaries and the other short comings of
UNCLOS means that most dispute settlements tend to
be difficult, and usually considered on a case-by-case
basis using precedent only as a guide if submitted
for review.235
Questioning their habitability, the Spratly Islands’
conditions prove harsh for personnel living there, as
one Chinese newspaper recorded that soldiers must
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endure “shortages of fresh water and vegetables,
loneliness, bad weather, and hard life. . . .”236 The resulting cost of the financial and physical commitment
by each occupying state is high,237 and may explain
in part why the Philippines withdrew from Mischief
Reef in 1995, allowing PLAN troops to occupy the
feature in their stead. The nearest case of a disputed
South China Sea feature meeting the requirements for
a habitable island may be Woody Island, the largest
of the Paracels, occupied and settled by the PRC with
a decades-old population of some size.238 To demonstrate its control and habitability of this island, the
PRC has made it an administrative capital and significantly upgraded its transportation and life support infrastructure.239 Itu Aba, occupied by Taiwan and the
largest island in the Spratlys group, is reported to
have two natural springs on the island, but has never
had a permanent population nor sustained economic
activity on its own, despite many attempts to show
official control.240 Hasjim Djalal, an Indonesian expert
who was President of the UNCLOS Assembly of the
International Sea-Bed Authority and coordinator of
the informal “Track II” workshops among the South
China Sea disputants, doubts that any of the Spratly
Islands could be considered habitable.241 In 2009 when
establishing continental shelf claims with the UN,
Vietnam and Malaysia made no shelf claims based on
contested islands, indicating they did not meet Article
121 viability or economic criteria to do so. The new
principles and definitions in the 1982 UNCLOS law
have stirred problems in the South China Sea, which
some commentators believe could best be managed
by declaring the features “legally uninhabitable,”242
or pooling the maritime zones each might generate to
be “shared regionally and managed by a joint devel-
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opment resource agency.”243 Within these bookends
of open ocean and collective sovereign waters lays a
continuum of maritime control by the coastal states.
Maritime Jurisdictions.
After sovereignty over a geologic feature and its
type are determined, then the maritime jurisdictions
it controls are established through UNCLOS. The Law
of the Sea Treaty determines how much authority a
state asserts over neighboring sea as weighted by the
type of land feature it is based upon and the distance
from the coastline. The types of waters that may be
assigned are sovereign internal waters (including
closely related archipelagic and historic waters), territorial waters, contiguous zones, EEZs, sometimes a
continental shelf extension, and the high seas. The high
seas are the res communis open for use by all states,
although regulated somewhat by both customary law
and UNCLOS as to how activities may be conducted.
Examples of regulating the high seas include customary laws against piracy or slavery, and UNCLOS Part
XI rules on the gathering of nonliving and sedentary
resources from the ocean floor244—objections to the
latter has kept the United States from ratifying the
Law of the Sea Treaty. The boundaries and rights of
the littoral zones are explained in this section in order
to better present the potential maritime jurisdictions
that are claimed in the Spratly Islands region, and
their implications for U.S. interests.
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Internal, Archipelagic, and Historic Sovereign Waters.
The most restrictive maritime zones are internal
waters in which the state has complete sovereignty,
as if over its own internal lakes and land. Internal
waters are adjacent national waters with access to the
sea, but are inside a series of straight baselines that
may connect barrier islands or cross the mouth of a
narrow bay, and thus are treated as under the full
sovereignty of the state.245 Smooth coastline states
might rate no internal waters, whereas countries with
chains of nearby fringe islands, like the U.S. eastern
seaboard, or deeply indented coastline, like that found
in Alaska, would have internal waters from the shore
to the straight baseline that connects the outer most
part of these features, as stipulated in Article 7 and
subsequent guidance in UNCLOS.246 Applying this
law, the United States has sovereign control over its
Intracoastal Waterway on the landward side of the
east coast barrier islands, but only territorial waters
control on the seaward side of those islands. Establishing a straight baseline simplifies rugged sea borders,
and is advantageous since it not only grants sovereign
control over adjacent waters, but, as its name implies,
moves the line from which other maritime zones are
measured from the shore (or normal baseline) to the
straight baseline, and makes all waters landward from
the straight baseline sovereign internal waters. For this
reason, straight baselines are often liberally drawn, as
have been done by the PRC, Malaysia, the Philippines,
and Vietnam, and which have been protested by the
United States as exceeding their rightful allowances.247
The only exception in UNCLOS to complete sovereignty over internal waters is to allow innocent passage across recently drawn straight baselines “which
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had not previously been considered as such,” mostly
affecting states through whose waters traditional international shipping routes pass.248 Although straight
baselines are not directly applied in the Spratly Islands, their use along neighboring shores does influence the amount of maritime jurisdiction that may be
claimed among them from national boundaries.
A new construct for internal waters found in UNCLOS Part IV is that of archipelagic waters, codified
in part to supersede the thorny concept of historic waters.249 Archipelagic waters were specifically intended
to give fragmented island states, like Indonesia and
the Philippines, authority over the waters within the
confines of their archipelago as defined by its baselines.250 Here, however, the enclosing lines are called
straight archipelagic baselines, and are drawn further
afield than the tips of adjacent craggy peninsulas and
fringe islands. Archipelagic baselines may connect the
outermost features of an archipelago with lines up to
100-nm long to enclose an area of no more than 1 to
9 land to water ratio.251 Although the Spratly Islands
themselves are a geographic archipelago, they would
not fall under this legal regime because they are not
a sovereign state. Should the PRC or another continental state gain control over the Spratlys it could not
control them through the archipelagic state provisions
since the mainland is not a part of the archipelago.252
The Philippines, however, could be an exception
since it is an archipelagic state as defined in 1961 in its
Republic Act 3046, but which did not include the Spratlys among its homeland islands.253 Australian geographer Dr. Victor Prescott, however, postulated that the
Philippines could claim Kalaya’an as an archipelagic
appendage in a scheme using three archipelagic baselines between 100 and 125-nm and drying reefs, both
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of which are explicitly allowed under UNCLOS Article 47. This new configuration would also keep an
acceptable land to water ratio of 1:2.4. 254 In 2009, the
Philippine Congress updated its maritime borders in
the Archipelagic Baseline Law of the Philippines to better comply with international law. Although this act
claims both Kalaya’an and nearby Scarborough Shoal
as Philippine, it did not do so through archipelagic
baselines despite much debate in support of using that
method.255 Thus, the Philippines claims the Spratlys
through the island regime methods previously discussed, rather than these archipelagic procedures—
although the new Philippine baseline law specifically
does not rule out this method in the future, but declares it would only do so in full compliance with UNCLOS stipulations.256
Historic claims, beyond those now covered under
archipelagic baseline rules, are also considered internal waters under customary law. Although historic
waters are not officially defined, they are occasionally
referenced in UNCLOS, such as Article 10’s “historic
bays” or Article 15’s reference to “historic title.”257 According to maritime law author L. J. Bouchez, historic
waters are:
waters over which the coastal State, contrary to the
generally applicable rules of international law, clearly,
effectively, continuously, and over a substantial period of time, exercises sovereign rights with the acquiescence of the community of States.258

Its appeal to states is that historic waters hold the
sovereignty of internal waters, but do not include
the innocent-transit-across-baselines caveat found in
UNCLOS archipelagic waters regime. Thus attaining
historic waters status restricts freedom of navigation
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and curtails the exploitation of oceanic resources by
the international community.259 As preceding law,
historic waters may also override UNCLOS statutes,
for instance allowing historic bays wider than 24-nm
at the mouth, or giving precedence to historic waters
contrary to overlapping territorial water claims which
would otherwise be settled with a median line between them.260 The motivation for a state to claim such
waters is obvious, and both Vietnam and China make
sweeping historic claims to large parts of the South
China Sea, as previously presented.
Although some commentators assert that historic
claim doctrine is obsolete or at least transitional, these
claims remain very active in practice through the legal principle of stare decisis.261 Nonetheless, UNCLOS
was written to minimize the use of historic claims,
and they are generally recognized by the international
community only in exceptional circumstances.262 As
already demonstrated in the Spratlys, the Vietnamese and Chinese historic claims are not convincingly
documented, lacking the continuity and long-term exercise of rights recognized by other states as defined
by Bouchez. For example, it would be difficult for a
state to claim historic waters where foreign ships transit on a regular basis as has routinely occurred around
the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.263 Some officials in Beijing are reported to recognize that their
sweeping claim for South China Sea historic waters
conflicts with UNCLOS, and believe a more appropriate claim is for just the islets within its U-shaped line
with their adjacent waters.264 At least one commentator believes that Vietnamese officials are also relenting
on claiming historic waters to argue its claims in terms
of UNCLOS EEZ and continental shelf articles.265 Although not taken seriously by the international com-
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munity, historic waters could be a powerful and excluding disruptor if awarded to any claimant in the
South China Sea.
Territorial Seas and Contiguous Zones.
Close to internal waters in concept and proximity
are the maritime zones of territorial sea and contiguous waters. Territorial seas codify the customary legal
practice of state control over waters within 3-nm of
its shores, but UNCLOS expands this zone to up to
12-nm from the baseline. Articles 33 and 121 allow every natural feature above the high water mark to have
territorial waters and up to an additional 12-nm for
a contiguous zone, and each of the South China Sea
states have established each of the UNCLOS allowed
zones.266 Territorial seas are treated as the coastal state’s
sovereign territory, with exclusive rights to living and
nonliving resources down to and including the seabed and enforcement of applicable national laws, but
must still allow innocent passage to transiting foreign
vessels.267 The right of innocent passage through territorial waters requires that “the peace, good order, or
security of the coastal State” not be disturbed through
activities like fishing, polluting, information collection, firing weapons, or launching aircraft or boats in
accordance with Article 19.268 Coastal states may, of
course, prevent noninnocent passage through their
territorial waters, and may also temporarily suspend
innocent passage by all foreign vessels in specific areas as temporary security zones in their territorial sea
per Article 25.269 The contiguous zone is a nonsovereign transitional area that allows protections for the
coastal state to enforce national laws concerning customs, finance, immigration, and sanitation, but is oth-
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erwise governed as part of the less restrictive EEZ.270
Innocent passage is not needed to transit a contiguous
zone. Both zones were established to allow freedom
of navigation to all vessels from any state, but also to
ensure good order and control over adjacent waters
for the coastal state.
There are disagreements, however, over whether
innocent passage applies to all vessels or excludes
warships of another state, a major concern for the
United States which relies on innocent passage for
power projection. The 1958 convention that preceded
UNCLOS clearly allowed warships innocent passage
through territorial waters, and the drafting history of
UNCLOS indicates the same rights.271 UNCLOS rules
for innocent passage fall under Section 3, Subsection
A, entitled “Rules Applicable to All Ships” which
states “ships of all States, whether coastal or landlocked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through
the territorial sea.”272 Despite this rule, China, Vietnam, Malaysia and, in the past, the Philippines have
interpreted innocent passage to exclude warships or
their activities, and protest such transit vigorously.273
Vietnam’s 1980 Enactment No. 30-CP prohibits military
ships from both its territorial sea and contiguous zone
without 30 days advance permission, although its
2012 Law of the Sea has relaxed the requirement to just
prior notification.274 Further to sea are the PRC’s permanent restricted maritime military zones, created in
the 1960s, within and outside territorial waters in the
Bo Hai and Yellow Sea.275 Although these zones are
north of the South China Sea, they demonstrate longstanding Chinese actions that ignore UNCLOS Article
25, and could also be applied around the claimed
Spratly Islands as permanent political obstructions to
any foreign vessel’s passage in the region.
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Chinese policy since the early days of the Republic
in the 1920s, after its harsh history with maritime insecurity, also bars warships’ passage through its territorial seas and contiguous zones without prior consent “to safeguard its national security.”276 This was
first codified in the Declaration of the Government of the
PRC on the Territorial Sea in 1958, and reiterated in the
1992 Law on Territorial Waters and their Contiguous Areas, both of which explicitly included the Paracel and
Spratly Islands.277 The significance of maritime control
and innocent passage for the PRC explains in part why
China took more than 13 years to ratify UNCLOS, and
the reason for its accompanying reservations.278 The
issues of sovereignty and independence are the PRC’s
highest priority in its policy of Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The 1992 territorial waters law implied,
and actions have shown, that the PRC will enforce its
sovereignty for its claimed Paracel and Spratly Islands.279 Should this be fully enforced the international
community would face sovereign zones carved out of
the Spratly Islands region if the principle of discovery
and occupation is applied, and could mean most or all
of the sea becoming off limits without consent should
China or Vietnam enforce historic rights to the islets
or to historic waters.
Exclusive Economic Zones.
An innovation of modern maritime statutory law
is the EEZ, by which states possessing habitable islands and continental shores economically control up
to 200-nm of ocean and seabed from their baseline under Part V of UNCLOS.280 Unlike territorial seas, however, there is no state sovereignty over this zone, just
the authority to regulate the environment and natural
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resources, establishment of installations, and conduct
of “marine scientific research.”281 By controlling such
activities, EEZs are distinguished from the less-restrictive high seas. Unlike territorial seas, navigation and
over flight of an EEZ is not subject to the coastal state’s
control except to enforce the authorities allowed by
UNCLOS, such as resource management and pollution control.282 Based on these provisions to manage
the EEZ, the South China Sea states often challenge
each other’s activities in their ambiguous and overlapping claimed EEZs, and use their interpretations to restrict operations of foreign military craft—as already
presented in this monograph.
Under customary law the distances over which
states controlled adjacent waters were short, and the
amount of overlapping jurisdictions small. When UNCLOS extended the maritime jurisdictions and created
the EEZ, with states 400-nm apart becoming maritime
neighbors, the problem of many unilateral and overlapping EEZ claims in the Spratlys resulted.283 In such
cases, delimitation establishes maritime jurisdiction
boundaries between states’ valid claims for territorial
seas, contiguous zones, EEZs, and continental shelf.284
To remove contention from such decisions the earlier
1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea proposed
a line halfway between the coastlines of overlapping
jurisdictions, using the “equidistance principle,” to
delimitate disputed areas that could not be otherwise
settled.285 However, this straightforward method was
modified in the 1970s in international court judgments
that found even habitable lands may each carry different weight in the generation of maritime zones
based on the length of their coastlines.286 Of course,
where no overlap occurs, all habitable islands receive
full maritime zones, but when small islands’ juris-
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dictions abut larger islands or larger islands’ zones
overlap continental landmasses, the smaller feature
will receive less than full effect depending on each
circumstance.287 Weighing the amount of jurisdiction
awarded in disputes to the more significant land formation is the essence of the current “equitable principle,” which ensures the amount of area awarded in
an EEZ is proportional to the length of the coastlines
involved, and not usually influenced by economic,
ecological, or other characteristics.288
The awarding of an EEZ using these rules is important in the Spratly Islands because of the consequences for regional economic development and
international navigation. Unlike territorial seas and
contiguous zones, economically unviable rocks do not
generate an EEZ or a continental shelf claim.289 Under
these conditions, an exposed rock would then become an enclave of territorial waters for one state surrounded by the high seas or the EEZ of another state’s
nearby eligible landmass.290 Since the Philippines,
Malaysia, Vietnam, and Brunei all claim 200-nm EEZs
from their baselines, the states closest to the Spratlys would dominate the region’s maritime resources,
outside of the territorial waters given to some rocks.
Thus Malaysia’s EEZ would regulate the seas around
the southeastern Spratly Islands; the Philippines, the
seas around the northeastern features; Vietnam, the
waters out to a few of the western most features (such
as Spratly Island, West Reef, and parts of Rifleman
Bank); and Brunei’s EEZ would control around Louisa
Reef.291 Since Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines
have each also determined that none of their Spratly
Islands are habitable in their EEZ and continental
shelf submissions in 2009 to the UN Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf, none of the islands
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may generate an EEZ in their judgment.292 This leaves
a band of high seas stretching from the Northeast
Cay to parts of Rifleman Bank in the southwestern
Spratlys which would be governed only by UNCLOS
Article 87, the Freedom of the High Seas section, and
the International Seabed Authority for sea floor resources.293 Where overlap occurs between their EEZs,
Malaysia has shown a proclivity to delimitate its differences through diplomacy with Vietnam and Brunei
in their joint EEZ and continental shelf claims—both
accomplished in 2009.294 When interpreted under the
intent of UNCLOS, establishment of EEZs is relatively
straightforward in the Spratlys’ region.
Some aspects of EEZ claims in the South China
Sea, however, are nonstandard or ambiguous, and
their vigorous pursuit complicates the region’s maritime delimitation. For instance, Brunei uses its 200-nm
EEZ to claim Louisa Reef, with two small rocks above
high tide, and then claims an EEZ around those rocks
extending it to an equidistant line with Vietnam’s
zone that puts Rifleman Bank in Brunei’s super-extended EEZ. Such a claim is probably not sustainable,
however, since effective occupation, not UNCLOS, is
the method to claim Louisa Reef, and Brunei has not
done so nor enforced its maritime laws effectively in
the EEZ. Furthermore, rocks cannot generate an EEZ
on their own.295 A different EEZ complication comes
with the possibility of the Philippine’s annexing the
Spratlys as integral to its archipelago. In 1978, President Ferdinand Marcos proclaimed Kalaya’an as part
of the Philippines and established an EEZ around
all the Philippine Islands—which some commentators believe included the Spratlys—which could give
the Philippines an additional baseline to establish
an EEZ.296 Although the Philippine government has
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not yet employed the archipelagic rules to annex the
Spratlys, it reserves that option for the future. However, given the EEZ claims from neighboring states,
this resolution to Spratlys’ ownership would probably
only generate different disputes over the delimitation
of conflicting EEZs.
Should ROC-occupied Itu Aba be determined as
the only habitable island in the Spratlys, another EEZ
complication arises. Itu Aba’s position inside the very
western edge of the Philippine EEZ means it would
probably have little to no EEZ of its own to its east, but
to the west could control the waters in the erstwhile
high seas from well north of Northeast Cay to Rifleman Bank.297 Should these be determined to be internal waters, as Vietnamese or Chinese historic waters,
EEZs would be of diminished consequence in any scenario since these would be sovereign seas that would
impinge upon the lesser authorities of an EEZ. These
historic claims might complicate the South China Sea
maritime disputes, however, based upon the extent
of Vietnam and China’s ambiguous historic claims
which probably overlap with the 200-nm EEZ originating from Indonesia’s undisputed Natuna Island,
between Borneo and Vietnam. Each claim encompasses at least some of the proven Natuna maritime
natural gas fields, and thereby embroils Indonesia in
the South China Sea dispute.298 Within any of these
scenarios, historic rights, like fishing access to an area
or modified delimitation of a zone, may also be pursued against another country’s EEZ.299 In China’s view
“a claim derived from historic rights may seem more
forceful and valid in law than claims simply based
upon the EEZ concept,” and even if jurisdiction based
on historical claims is rejected, they still offer the potential for other historic rights, like access to tradi-
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tional fishing areas, that cannot be otherwise attained
through UNCLOS methods.300 The combinations of
customary and statutory maritime laws with different
national interpretations lead to a wide variance in the
amount of control that may result, but in most cases
occupying islands in the sterile Spratlys will probably
gain little in the surrounding waters.301
In addition to the delimitation of EEZs, how they
are enforced is also very important to the United
States. In their implementing domestic laws, both the
PRC and ROC claim a 200-nm EEZ and accompanying
rights to regulate them under UNCLOS.302 At well over
400-nm from the nearest Chinese landmass, no Chinese EEZ would influence the Spratly Islands region
directly. However, should China start enforcing an
EEZ around Itu Aba or other occupied features in the
Spratlys, it would challenge foreign military vessels
and aircraft to seek permission to operate within these
EEZs as it now does in its mainland EEZ.303 Through
its claimed historic rights of special security interests
and application of UNCLOS, the PRC requires that
activities should “refrain from any threat or use of
force” in the EEZ (the intent of UNCLOS definition
on transit passage under Part III on straits navigation).304 China treats its EEZ as a military buffer zone,
contending that U.S. military surveillance ships and
reconnaissance flights violate the spirit of UNCLOS
and China’s historic rights in the South China Sea, and
seeks to restrict such activities.305 Thus PRC laws maintain peace in its EEZ by barring foreign military vessels citing Article 58 which directs that states “should
comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the
coastal State in accordance with the provision of this
Convention.”306 If the coastal state’s laws are disputed,
Chinese scholars declare that deference be given to the
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PRC per Article 59, “taking into account the respective
importance of the interests involved to the parties as
well as to the international community as a whole.”307
The United States rejects this interpretation contending it is a minority view held by only 27 of the
161 ratifying states (although significantly, Malaysia
is also one of the states enforcing a restrictive EEZ).308
Focusing on one particularly irksome activity, Chinese officials place “military survey and military information gathering . . . into the category of ocean scientific research which requires prior permission from
the coastal states.”309 Through applying maritime law
in this way, the PRC uses “international law as an
adjunct to [its] military forces to achieve anti-access
maritime objectives.”310 The triple problem of whether
its occupied features can even generate an EEZ, the
amount of EEZ such a feature would gain against the
neighboring larger landmasses, and whether foreign
military vessels or certain activities are barred from
an EEZ, make this a very tenuous legal argument for
China.311 However, it could be a useful justification for
keeping U.S. vessels out of the South China Sea from
a security standpoint, which China could then better
defend militarily than legally. In the case of Malaysia,
its coastline EEZ does encompass many of the Spratly
Islands, but its contention that bars military vessels
still keeps it in a minority position within the international community—unless ever evolving international
sentiment calls again for a change to the Law of the
Sea Treaty.
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Continental Shelf Claims.
Although not a jurisdiction that includes a water
column like the spaces discussed above, the UNCLOS
continental shelf zone is important to adjacent states
for the management of nonliving resources and sedentary species on and under the seabed. Extended claims
for adjacent ocean floor began with the United States
in 1945, and the concept was subsequently incorporated in Article I of the 1958 Convention on the Continental
Shelf with a limit of 200 meter isobaths or the depth
of exploitability.312 By 1969 the International Court of
Justice instituted the “natural prolongation principle,”
which acknowledged that states had jurisdiction over
a much extended continental shelf, although not necessarily from islets or minor coastal features.313 The
resulting UNCLOS articles updating this extended authority were a compromise that allowed a coastal state
to control surrounding seabed to the natural length of
its continental shelf or to a maximum of 350-nm from
the baseline, but also gave geographically challenged
states with little adjacent continental shelf at least a
200-nm EEZ that also controlled the seabed below it.314
Under UNCLOS, states do not need to exploit or occupy the continental shelf to retain exclusive economic
rights to its seabed, which includes protrusions from
the seabed floor that remain submerged.315 In Articles
78 and 79, however, it is clear that rights to the continental shelf do not affect the superjacent waters or
airspace above it, to include navigation and the unfettered laying of submarine cables and pipelines.316
The states around the South China Sea supported this
greater control over their continental shelf that UNCLOS gave them, and have used it to their economic
and political advantage.317
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These rights over the more distant areas from the
claimants’ shores come with more obligations than
other UNCLOS zones in how they are delimitated.
Here the claiming state must first scientifically stake
the extent of its continental shelf beyond 200-nm with
the UN’s Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf, which then must qualify it for technical compliance.318 This is an exacting process that must be
completed within 10 years of ratification of UNCLOS,
although many developing countries received an extension to May 2009. Even then the Philippines had
to rush to meet this closing date in which it also established refined baselines that did not incorporate
archipelagic rules, explaining an action cited earlier in
this monograph. The Commission cannot qualify an
extended continental shelf claim, however, if it is part
of a territorial or maritime disagreement with another
state, by the Rules of Procedure of the Commission.319
Consent from the other involved states can be difficult
to obtain in the contentious South China Sea environment, as seen in the 2009 joint Vietnamese-Malaysian
continental shelf submission to which the PRC and the
Philippines objected.320 Further complicating delimitation of a continental shelf is the potential divergence
of an EEZ water column from the continental shelf below it with each assigned to a different jurisdiction.321
This may occur when the EEZs of a continental state
and small island do not overlap, but the natural continental shelf extends out to undercut the island’s EEZ,
or when negotiated by two parties. Split continental
shelf and superjacent EEZ ownership are uncommon,
and no resolution in the Spratlys region has resorted
to this yet—with the few negotiated settlements instead using a single line for both EEZ and continental
shelf.322 These continental shelf rules, however, make
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already complicated circumstances around the Spratly
Islands that much more difficult to resolve.
South China Sea continental shelf complications
are manifested in novel sovereignty claims and overlapping maritime jurisdictions. China, the Philippines,
Malaysia, and Brunei each make territorial claims to
submerged features in the Spratlys, rather than maritime jurisdictional control over them as stipulated in
UNCLOS.323 The three ASEAN states assert sovereignty over these submerged features based on their
extended continental shelf. Unable to resort to historic
or archipelagic claims, Malaysia relies on continental
shelf extension as its second method to stake sovereignty over geologic features in addition to discovery
and occupation. In its Continental Shelf Acts of 1966 and
1969, based on the 1958 Law of the Sea Treaty, Malaysia
stated its continental shelf is to 200 meters depth or
the limit of exploitability. During the UNCLOS formulation discussions, Malaysia produced in 1979 its
Map Showing the Territorial Waters and Continental Shelf
Boundaries delimitating its extensive continental shelf
and claiming all of its geologic features.324 Malaysia
thus counts sovereignty over 12 islands and reefs:325
based principally on certain continental shelf provisions in the 1982 UNCLOS. . . . The clear inference
from Malaysia’s claims is that a state possessing a continental shelf also possesses sovereign rights over land
formations arising seaward from that shelf.326

Without an accompanying occupation of Louisa
Reef or Rifleman Bank, Brunei’s sovereignty claim
to both depends solely on its continental shelf and
EEZ claims extending to a median line with Vietnam’s claims, as unilaterally made in 1985. Its justification follows arguments similar to those made by
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Malaysia.327 The Philippines claims Kalaya’an through
the natural prolongation of its shelf, but also its contiguous nature to the Philippine islands and through
occupation of some of the features.328 For each of these
states, UNCLOS is an important way to defend its
sovereignty over claimed parts of the Spratly Islands.
As with the other forms of claims, however, those
made through UNCLOS have serious weaknesses.
The first weakness is legal since, despite these interpretations, much of the international community does
not recognize sovereignty claims to territory made
through UNCLOS continental shelf articles, a purpose
for which they were not intended.329 The second weakness is geographic. The natural prolongation of a continental shelf stretches only to a point on its slope that
plunges to the ocean’s depths creating a natural marine boundary. Should a state’s shelf plunge close to
shore, then it is limited to just its 200-nm EEZ. Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines’ claims to an extended
continental shelf, much less sovereignty over geologic
features in the extended area, fall short in the deep Palawan and Manila trenches which effectively moat off
the length of the Spratly Islands from the main shores
of all three states to their southeast.330 Thus Malaysia
has determined its continental shelf limit only extends
as far as its EEZ, while Brunei and the Philippines have
not yet declared a continental shelf limit in the South
China Sea.331 The very deep northern South China Sea
extends a finger shielding virtually all of the Spratlys
from Vietnam’s shelf also, to as far south as Rifleman
Bank.332 Thus Vietnam makes no extended continental
shelf claims encompassing the Spratlys, but has settled
potential overlapping claims with Malaysia through a
joint submission to the Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf, and has negotiated a boundary
line with the PRC in the shallow Gulf of Tonkin.333 The
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sub-maritime geographic configuration of the Spratly
Islands, then, is that of a relatively shallow sea table
isolated by peripheral bands of much deeper waters.
Although useful in establishing a jurisdiction over the
resources of the contiguous seabed, the extended continental shelf allowed by UNCLOS does not sanction
states to claim sovereignty over geologic features, and
does not seem to apply geographically to the Spratly
Islands even for extended control over its seabed.
The distance and the intervening ocean topography do not allow China to claim a continental shelf
extension to the Spratlys from its homeland shores.
However, interesting scenarios concerning the EEZ or
continental shelf still ensue should China, or another
state, convert one of its unique claims in the Spratlys,
as already covered, into reality. The most vexing perhaps is the ill-defined Chinese historic claim which
could trump other customary and UNCLOS claims
in the region. China’s historic claim within its South
China Sea U-shaped line includes all surface and subsurface features.334 This encompassing claim squarely
conflicts with EEZ and continental shelf claims made
by each of the ASEAN claimant states.335 In the southwestern part of the South China Sea, the depths are
shallow at generally less than 200 meters and a submitted joint extended continental shelf claim splits
the region with an equidistance median line between
Vietnam and Malaysia.336 However, China’s historic
claims cover much of this area and its actions seem
to disregard UNCLOS assigned jurisdictions. For instance, in 1992 the PRC created the Crestone oil exploration block around Vanguard and Prince of Wales
Banks (the most southwestern of all the Spratly features but also within 200-nm of the Vietnamese baseline, and both banks occupied by Vietnam), in order
to conduct drilling operations within what otherwise
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would be Vietnamese jurisdiction.337 A similar problem exists in the southern South China Sea, where
parts of Malaysia’s continental shelf down to only 200
isobaths is claimed by the PRC in its U-shaped line
to include North and South Luconia Shoals, Friendship Shoals, and James Shoals. This puts Malaysia’s
EEZ and continental shelf claim in direct conflict with
China’s historic claim, although here China has taken
no actions to exploit its claim.338
Since the Spratly Islands sit on an elevated table of
land mostly surrounded by continental shelf ending
trenches, should Itu Aba or other islands be judged
habitable, each could generate an EEZ and continental
shelf extension claim of its own to at least the edge of
the Spratlys’ shallow sea slope and to where the surrounding states’ EEZs or continental shelves did not
overlap it.339 This scenario would remove nearly the
entire available high seas to the southwest and north
of Itu Aba, to the limits allowed by UNCLOS, from exploitation by other states.340 In another case, a successful Philippine archipelagic claim to Kalaya’an would
gain an EEZ and continental shelf from the new archipelagic baselines that would absorb much of the
current high seas areas in the southern South China
Sea. The amount of high seas seabed available in the
South China Sea is of interest to the United States
since high seas areas are exploitable by any state for
their resource wealth, and maximizing the availability
of deep sea regions and economic return from them is
one of the major factors hindering the United States
from ratifying UNCLOS. Thus, the extended continental shelf disputes and their resolution will remain
a point for the United States to monitor and influence
to maintain its own interests and set precedents to
its liking.
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Territorial and Jurisdiction Claim Summary.
As a “semi-enclosed sea” dominated by overlapping maritime claims, the South China Sea bordering
countries are enjoined by UNCLOS Article 123 to “cooperate with each other in the exercise of their rights
and performance of their duties” above that normally
expected of other maritime states.341 The shared nature of migratory fish resources, indistinct location of
energy sites and advent of lateral drilling, cumulative
effect of environmental damage, competing territorial
claims and rights, and tight confines that result in confused and conflicting maritime jurisdictions, demonstrate why cooperation is an ideal, if unrealized, goal
in the South China Sea.342 Although a few diplomatic
advances to address these myriad regional concerns
have been made along the sea’s periphery, the states
have more often adhered to customary and statuary
legal principles that best favor their geopolitical positions.343 Under this system, the coveted maritime
zones of territorial seas, contiguous zones, EEZs, and
extended continental shelves depend upon the determination of sovereignty over and classification of
claimed land features, which is the core of the Spratly
Islands disputes.344 The by-product of demonstrating
effective sovereign control and administration over
these claims, unfortunately, has sometimes resulted in
aggressive and violent enforcement of national laws,
which makes this an important issue to address, in
order to prevent miscommunication, accident, or impatience to be used to justify the use of force to settle
the disputes.
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Until now, however, the disputants have mainly
resorted to making outsized claims to maximize any
future negotiated outcome, or strengthen their case
before arbitration or a tribunal.345 China, Vietnam,
Malaysia, and the Philippines have each asserted sovereignty through discovery and occupation, the most
internationally accepted legal method,346 and, in this,
Vietnam leads with 29 garrisons or about as many as
the rest of the stations in the Spratlys combined. Vietnam and China also make ill-defined historic claims as
another approach to territory, waters, and/or rights,
although a method not well-regarded by the international community and, in its collective judgment, lacking sufficient documentation in its application.347 Under UNCLOS principles, the Philippines has not yet
tested its basis for Kalaya’an through the archipelagic
articles, while land claims espoused by Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Brunei through proximity, EEZs, or
continental shelf extensions are dubious for legal or
geographic reasons. None of the economically unproductive Spratlys may themselves even generate extended maritime zones, or, if some could, they would
probably be given diminished domain against larger
land masses under the equitable principle, thereby
greatly reducing their significance and the importance
of sovereignty over them.348 Although each of the disputants involved has ratified UNCLOS, each also takes
exception to its settlement mechanisms and other select provisions that reduce the overall effectiveness
of the treaty to reconcile maritime disputes.349 Under
the current island sovereignty approach in the Spratly
Islands dispute, probably “no government today can
establish sufficiently substantial legal grounds to validate its claim in the eyes of the international community,”350 and these legal stances have done little so far
to create solutions.351
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U.S. INTERESTS AND RESPONSES TO THE
ISSUES AROUND THE SPRATLY ISLANDS
With this background established, it is clear that
events in the South China Sea affect important U.S.
interests. The information given so far was presented to better inform policymakers about the involved
states’ diplomatic, military, police, and legal issues
and actions. The issues are complex and contradictory, meaning any U.S. involvement needs to be well
informed and nuanced. This section reviews the most
relevant U.S. interests in the Spratly Islands region
in terms of freedom of navigation, economic activities, and the competing U.S. roles of honest broker for
peace and stability among the disputants and regional
balancer of power for its security partners. Without
maritime jurisdiction or territorial claims of its own in
the South China Sea but strong interests in how these
issues are resolved, U.S. involvement by necessity is
mostly indirect support and grounded in international law, but is also motivated by a political component.
Based on these interests, this monograph makes a few
recommendations on how the United States may positively influence the situation in the South China Sea
to enhance its interests and those of the disputants.
Due to the underlying nature of this situation, these
recommendations emphasize more the diplomatic, information, and economic elements of U.S. power over
military ones.
Although President Barack Obama’s administration again made the Asia-Pacific region a top U.S.
priority in 2012, this region has been a major U.S.
economic and security focus since Commodore Matthew Perry opened Japan in 1854.352 In particular, five
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important U.S. global interests are represented there
today, including protecting free and unimpeded commerce in the global commons, securing peace and
stability among the states, supporting diplomacy
and rules-based conduct, ensuring the U.S. military’s
freedom to operate in compliance with international
law, and providing support to U.S. allies and defense
partners.353 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reiterated these interests specifically for the South China
Sea region at the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 2010
emphasizing that:
The United States, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s
maritime commons, and respect for international law
in the South China Sea. . . . The United States supports
a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for
resolving the various territorial disputes without coercion. We oppose the use or threat of force by any claimant. While the United States does not take sides on the
competing territorial disputes over land features in
the South China Sea, we believe claimants should pursue their territorial claims and accompanying rights to
maritime space in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Consistent with customary
international law, legitimate claims to maritime space
in the South China Sea should be derived solely from
legitimate claims to land features.354

To achieve these goals, Secretary Clinton emphasized the need to cooperate in areas of common interest in trade, peace, security, and transnational problems like climate change and nuclear proliferation,
especially with China.355 However as an interested
party, the United States is also maintaining a relatively
balanced playing field which might make it a “little bit
easier for the governments in the region to acquire the
necessary political will” to resolve their disputes.356
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Increased U.S. involvement may have started this
process in July 2011 when the PRC agreed with Vietnam to implement long-delayed guidelines to govern
their disagreements if for no other reason than to limit
U.S. involvement.357 In short, the United States seeks
to ensure the legal rights that it and the international
community should enjoy in the region, support the
legitimate interests of its regional partners, and act
upon common ground with China and other involved
states to their mutual benefit to improve stability and
prosperity in the region.
U.S. Freedom of Navigation Interests.
The issue of immediate concern for the United
States, because it may be the most volatile, and the first
national interest listed by Secretary Clinton is freedom
of navigation.358 Since UNCLOS was under negotiation in 1979, the U.S. global Freedom of Navigation
Program seeks to dispute excessive sea and airspace
claims perceived to violate international law by challenging them diplomatically and physically.359 China,
Vietnam, and Malaysia hold restrictive passage views
concerning their coastal home waters and potentially
in their claimed territorial waters, contiguous zone,
and EEZs around the Spratly Islands. These positions
place them at odds with most other states’ open-use
positions, and China sees this issue as an excuse for the
United States to continue to intervene in South China
Sea issues.360 The PRC has more aggressively and consistently enforced such restrictions in its claims than
any other state—threatening freedom of navigation
for all maritime states, and risking armed clashes and
instability, especially when backed by its advanced
anti-access and area-denial capabilities.361 After the
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1995 PRC occupation of Mischief Reef in the midst of
the Philippine EEZ, the United States made clear its
stance for freedom of navigation in the region, and in
1998 specifically sent a carrier battle group near the
Spratlys to assert American prerogatives.362 Thus the
United States demonstrated how important it considers these rights for itself and those of other interested
third parties like Japan.363
Despite the chronic tensions, with the growth of
prosperity in the region, the need for stability and security, and pursuit of other common interests, the perspective of each party may start to converge in settling
their differences. The United States has made progress
toward this with Vietnam through a code of conduct
concerning activities on the South China Sea, negotiations on navigation, and improved military ties.364 This
better understanding may have contributed to Vietnam relaxing its coastal EEZ transit requirements in
2012 to be more in accord with UNCLOS standards.365
As the PRC’s economy grows and its international
commitments expand, China’s interests may converge
with the more global U.S. views in balancing broad
international maritime rights with coastal state rights
that China now favors.366 The PRC is the world’s largest exporter and second largest importer, and thus
highly depends on the maritime commons to keep its
economy growing and has prospered from the open
shipping order assured by U.S. naval power. However as China’s dependence on seaborne trade continues, it may want to protect its own shipping and sea
lines of communication rather than rely on its partner
and competitor, the United States, to do so.367 Among
the largest merchant marine fleets and navies in the
world, China’s perspective should transition to accept
the majority interpretation of UNCLOS—meaning
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more open use of sea jurisdictions and a conventional
interpretation of coastal states’ rights in its EEZ and
territorial sea. Indeed, U.S. interests also seem to be
evolving toward embracing stronger coastal states’
rights in its own EEZ for economic and environmental protection, thus converging interests may make
resolving this issue easier over time to enable completion of some of these suggestions.368
To spur this convergence of interests, specific steps
should be taken by the United States to defuse the freedom of navigation issue, especially with China where
the most active differences lie. The United States could
back away from its insistence on exercising its rights
to navigation in the South China Sea and its coastal
waters in order to ease chronic tensions on this issue.
This action was recently recommended by former U.S.
National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski with
support of others, but doing this for long could needlessly weaken U.S. and other states’ worldwide commitment to UNCLOS open-sea provisions.369 Instead,
as the United States invites the PRC to take a more
involved role in ensuring stability and security in the
international commons, it should work with China to
establish a common understanding on maritime rights
in coastal waters and abroad since that is ultimately
in both of their interests. The United States and China
already have the 1998 Military Maritime Consultative
Agreement to prevent incidents between them, and
although quite imperfectly applied it as a useful confidence building measure.370 The next step should follow the lead of the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Union Incidents at
Sea Agreement (INCSEA).371 This is a successful tool
that avoided negative encounters between the two
powers, yet complied with international law covering
activities like innocent passage through coastal juris-
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dictions. Through uniform procedures both sides may
follow and observe ships from the other side, but may
not interfere with their lawful passage, regardless of
prior notification, cargo, arms, or type of propulsion.372
INCSEA is a practical, tested method which could be
tailored to reduce tensions, support both sides longterm interests, and accelerate a process of confidence
building between the two—especially in the ambiguous Spratly Islands region.373
Other forms of cooperation, both military and civilian, could also help build better understanding and
trust, and work toward common interests like stability, countercrime, and freedom of navigation in the
region as envisioned by Secretary Clinton.374 A telling
example followed the major 2009 incident involving
the USS Impeccable, after which such incidents ceased
as both sides realized that cooperation on issues like
North Korea and the global economic recession were
more important.375 While many disputes over issues
like Taiwan and military surveillance in the EEZ
persist, both sides can build much needed trust and
cooperation through existing military and civilian
programs like the MMCA, and broaden to new ones
to work through their differences. Existing programs
to build upon include the “Sino-U.S. Maritime Security Consultation mechanism, the Annual Defense Affairs Consultation mechanism, and the Sino-U.S. Joint
Maritime Search and Rescue Exercises,” as well as the
Container Security Initiative signed in 2003 to combat
terrorism.376 Because of their nature, some new initiatives would be easier to implement such as information exchanges on piracy and terrorism, and maritime
disaster mitigation plans. With increased understanding and trust, combined personnel training for humanitarian missions or counterterrorism could fol-
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low, with standardized procedures and methods for
data and awareness sharing being developed.377 These
could directly improve relations and indirectly support freedom of navigation, and are actions that the
U.S. administration and Congress could support with
both China and the Southeast Asian states.378
The most promising cooperation has been through
the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), which may be more
politically acceptable to other governments when emphasizing its enforcement and rescue over its military
roles.379 The various Chinese maritime enforcement
agencies and the USCG have already enjoyed cooperative success through the multilateral North Pacific
Coast Guard Forum, student training exchanges, detailing Chinese officers aboard USCG cutters in the
North Pacific for enforcement actions against Chinese
fishermen, and combined bilateral and multilateral
exercises in port security, search and rescue, and law
enforcement. In 2006, the USCG established permanent liaisons with maritime agencies in four Chinese
ministries solidifying a good working relationship
with each.380 The Coast Guard offers other venues of
cooperation and confidence building such as sharing
its global expertise in protecting port and energy loading operations with Chinese authorities, whose country relies heavily on the safe and secure conduct of
maritime energy shipments.381 Coast Guard cooperation with China is a model to expand into other venues to increase understanding and reduce tensions for
issues both sides deem imperative.
Other U.S. military services should also play a
role in expanding trust and cooperation between the
United States, China, and the Southeast Asian states
through greater theater engagement using regionally
aligned forces. This is especially true for land forces
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because armies tend to dominate the region’s defense
forces in terms of budgets, leadership, and influence.
A Department of Defense (DoD)-wide program to assign regionally aligned forces to the region’s militaries under U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) integration would implement security assistance to enhance
states’ military capabilities. This should allow the
states in the dispute to negotiate in a more level environment, build regional understanding with guidance
from the Department of State, and build bilateral relations for the United States to act as an honest broker.
Regionally aligned forces entail specific units assigned
in military-to-military partnerships resulting in a better understanding by U.S. forces of local cultures and
languages, geography, military capabilities, and challenges.382 U.S. units and individuals gain insight and
establish enduring personal relations through training-focused visits in platoon to battalion size units.383
This approach in Southeast Asia especially makes
sense since China is the most likely U.S. peer rival,
so that recurring engagements with the PRC and its
neighbors should build trust, reduce tensions, address
differences in fields like maritime access, and establish
the United States as a regional conciliator.
The emphasis on land force engagement also
makes sense considering that the new AirSea Battle
doctrine parcels high-end missions like countering anti-access/area denial to the U.S. Air Force and
U.S. Navy in the role of balancing China’s power by
supporting and protecting the interests of allies and
partners in the region. It is left to the land forces and
coast guard, playing a smaller part in the defense of
the South China Sea region, to support the conciliator role by building trust, capability, and relationships through the U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and
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Special Operations forces as proposed by former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy.384 A more robust regime of exercising, education
exchanges, and contingency planning for events of importance to both the United States and the PRC could
slowly influence the PLA to better understand American positions, and the United States to understand
Chinese positions. As one of the major arbiters over
the freedom of navigation dispute within the Chinese
system, better relations with the PLA would be helpful
in resolving this and other issues both sides face. For
U.S. Army forces, upon which the brunt of regional
specialization would fall, this alignment concept follows the vision imperative in the Army Chief of Staff’s
2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance, “Provide modernized and ready, tailored land force capabilities to
meet Combatant Commanders’ requirements across
the range of military operations.”385 The benefits of regionally aligned forces include more effective interactions and support, improved U.S. understanding and
interoperability during multinational actions, and better understanding by both sides to allow the United
States more access and influence with partners and
competitors alike.
Elements of this regionally aligned force proposal
exist in the U.S. Army with Special Operations and
National Guard units already aligned to the Pacific region, with the Army soon to add active duty conventional forces also. Special Forces units have long specialized to improve partner states’ capabilities, build
their competence in the world’s regions as advisors
and operators, and build interoperability and trusted
relationships. The 1st Special Forces (SF) Group at Ft
Bragg, NC, currently operates under Special Operations Command Pacific covering Southeast Asia, Chi-
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na, and the rest of the Pacific region, along with the
U.S. Army National Guard 19th SF Group headquartered in Draper, UT.386 U.S. Army civil affairs (CA)
units also specialize to provide civil-military expertise
to conventional forces during theater engagement and
full spectrum military operations. The active duty
84th CA Battalion (CAB) at Joint Base Lewis-McCord
(JBLM) and 97th CAB at Ft Bragg also align with PACOM, as does the Army Reserve 364th CA Brigade in
Portland, OR.387 As part of its greater regional alignment initiative, in 2014 the Army plans to assign a
soon to be designated conventional unit from I Corps,
headquartered at JBLM, to support PACOM security
cooperation and partnership building activities.388
Reserve component forces, when regionally specialized, offer advantages to include greater personnel
stability, unique civilian expertise, and some military
skills not residing in the active forces, and have thus
been particularly effective at achieving high levels
of trust, understanding, and cooperation with partners.389 In PACOM, there are three long-term State
Partnership Programs with Southeast Asian states including the Hawaii and Guam Army National Guard
partnered with the Armed Forces of the Philippines
since 2000, the Hawaii National Guard also partnered
with the Indonesian National Armed Forces in 2006,390
and the People’s Army of Vietnam and Oregon National Guard partnered in 2012.391 State Partnership
Programs are sought-after force enablers which are
part of PACOM’s theater security cooperation plan.
These partnerships facilitate stability and security by
building partner capacity through exchanging military skills and experience, professional development,
exercising, and interagency cooperation.392
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As U.S. strategy emphasizes the Asia-Pacific region, aligning more Army units to support PACOM’s
security and engagement plans is a needed initiative
for peacetime shaping operations in order to resort
less to direct intervention.393 However, in an era of fiscal austerity, these needed efforts must be adequately
sustained and kept efficient to make them viable, be
allowed time to take root and grow, and be protected
against short-term budget cuts and competing strategic options.394 One easy-to-correct flaw in the active
duty conventional unit regional alignment scheme is
that units are only assigned to support a region for
1 year, unlike the long-term engagements of SF, CA,
and State Partnership units.395 Such an arrangement
will not build adequate regional expertise, personal
relations, or continuity in training and operations to
achieve combatant command requirements. Even
though active duty unit personnel change more often
than reserve component personnel, the institutional
links nonetheless remain important and active duty
units should be assigned long term regional commitments at the brigade or battalion levels. Another
consideration for the Army is that as deployments to
Central Command reduce, more units should be regionally aligned to PACOM to allow them to focus on
a sub-region like the states bordering the South China
Sea.396 The current scheme has SF, CA, and conventional forces supporting PACOM from Mongolia to New
Zealand which dilutes the merits of regionalization.
Units assigned to smaller regions or even to critical
countries, as done in the State Partnership Program,
allow deeper understanding of the region, richer and
more frequent contacts with a targeted group of key
people, and improved continuity in programs. These
alignment efforts would improve U.S. contributions
to stability and security in the South China Sea region.
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Regional alignment and specialization of units to
engagement and shaping tasks does come with problems and challenges. The first challenge is to get the
affected states to accept more U.S. involvement, and
hence influence, of this type. Although its past ties
and an insurgent threat made the Philippines an early
and enthusiastic supporter of recent U.S. engagement
activities, Vietnam has been a late and reluctant participant because of its need to balance U.S. overtures
with those of the Chinese and its past history with the
United States. Malaysia, more distant and on better
terms with the PRC than the other two, has cordial
military contacts with the United States but has not,
for instance, elected to partake in the State Partnership Program.397 As noted earlier in this section, the
nature of engagement with the PRC would be different than with the ASEAN countries, emphasizing different tasks and units, as accomplished by the USCG,
and must overcome deep historic and geopolitical
mistrust.398
Regional specialization of U.S. units and personnel is costly and comes at the expense of some combat
readiness, since engagement and combat training have
limited overlap. The investment in trained personnel
and established relationships would have to be protected too, requiring changes in the Army personnel
system to retain experienced military members, and
minimize out of unit assignments—in essence creating
a regimental system in the regionally aligned active
forces.399 Of course, task, equipment, and personnel
specialization comes with a price to large unit combat
skills, flexibility, and traditional force structure.400 In
a major operation elsewhere that requires the use of
PACOM aligned units, all of this specialization will be
for naught, and necessary maneuver, fire, and effects
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skills not as strong as their more often used engagement skills.401 In austere fiscal times, however, some
risk must be assumed in strategy and force structure
decisions, as U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Raymond Odierno, has made clear:
We always have to be prepared to fight our nation’s
wars if necessary, but in my mind, it’s becoming more
and more important that we utilize the Army to be effective in Phase 0, 1 and 2. . . .402

To mitigate these risks, the DoD planning considerations of flexibility and reversibility must be
inherent qualities in the formation of any regionally
aligned specialized units.403 In austere fiscal times, one
potential advantage of regionally aligned forces rotating into a region is that less infrastructure and cost is
required in comparison to as many units permanently
stationed overseas.404
Another very important step for the U.S. Government to better ensure the freedom of navigation rights
it now exercises is to formally ratify the UNCLOS treaty. This step is not just to return to equal footing with
other members on moral and legal grounds to better
support the rules-based-order that the United States
espouses, but also to be able to directly guide and protect U.S. interests in international fora and on the seas.
The United States signed UNCLOS in 1994 after successfully negotiating an amendment to the document
to correct earlier concerns by the industrialized states,
but has not formally ratified it through the Senate. The
most important provisions of UNCLOS, like maritime
jurisdictions and rights of passage, are in accord with
U.S. policy so that U.S. domestic laws generally adhere
to UNCLOS statutes, as they also do with customary
international laws.405 The Departments of Defense and
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State both support ratification to give the United States
“greater credibility in invoking the convention’s rules
and a greater ability to enforce them.”406 This treaty
has come before the Senate several times, as recently
as 2012, only to be tabled despite bipartisan support,
mainly due to economic concerns with Part XI stipulations that cover the deep seabed.407 A direct American voice in the Law of the Sea Treaty debates would
give the United States a stronger voice advocating for
freedom of navigation and other U.S. interests, thus
countering the historic trend toward circumscribing
rights and limiting areas of operation on the high seas.
Foreign military navigation rights through an EEZ are
a prime example of such restrictions, with 27 countries
supporting Chinese, Vietnamese, and Malaysian positions, including major maritime states such as India
and Brazil.408 The Senate needs to ratify this treaty to
allow the United States to actively defend its existing
maritime legal interests and rights.
Another way to support freedom of navigation
rights in the South China Sea is to have China and
Vietnam clarify their historic claims. In the modern era of statutory maritime law, sweeping historic
claims seem archaic, too incongruous to adjudicate effectively an area as openly used as the South China
Sea, and the ensuing disputes unnecessarily hobble
economic development and peace.409 The International Court of Justice has conceded that customary law
does not provide for a clear method of adjudicating
historic claims, so each case is settled differently based
on its specific merits.410 This gives both Vietnam and
China some basis for their historic claims, even while
the 1951 International Law Commission criteria make
these claims appear weak.411 Nonetheless, their restrictive interpretations of transit rules in conjunction with
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expansive Chinese and Vietnamese claims to historic
waters, if enforced, could close the very busy South
China Sea to military and commercial traffic, which
is why the United States and other maritime powers
have worked to diminish the doctrine of historic waters and curtail its widespread application.412 This is in
part what Secretary Clinton meant in her earlier quote
that “legitimate claims to maritime space in the South
China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate
claims to land features.”413
To defuse this problem what is required is that
China and Vietnam declare what their historic rights
entail—for example, waters, islands, rights to activities, or some combination—and where they are
claimed, since China has not explained its U-shaped
claim beyond publishing a map.414 So far, it has cost
the historic claimants little to hold these bargaining
positions with such sweeping ambiguous claims, and
it has become a convenient distraction and delaying
tactic. The United States, along with the ASEAN parties and other maritime states, should press China and
Vietnam “to particularize or justify its claim” to set the
stage for serious negotiations and eventual compromise on specific historic issues. 415 Dropping notorious
historic rights claims altogether in favor of current
maritime statutory law would simplify the dispute
to just occupation doctrine and UNCLOS provisions,
although this is an unlikely course, given the multilayered “insurance” approach each state employs. Either
method could successfully remove the dead weight
of historic claims to allow much needed economic development around the Spratlys, while also reducing
the specter of security threats that could derail other
initiatives and engulf the region in violence.
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Vietnam will find it particularly difficult to uphold its less documented and shorter duration historic
claim against China in a legal dispute, nor can it militarily match China’s ability to back its historic claim
with might (as proven by Vietnam’s physical loss of
the Paracel Islands, also a Vietnamese historic claim,
to Chinese occupation). However, Vietnam does have
a strong occupation presence in the Spratlys upon
which to rely. It might be convinced to transform its
undefined historic claims for the steadier position of
occupation and UNCLOS laws, especially if given
strong international support for current Vietnamese
island sovereignty, and coastal EEZ and continental
shelf claims that comply with UNCLOS. Such a policy
should garner consistent U.S. support in accordance
with Secretary Clinton’s call for settling legitimate
territorial and maritime claims using UNCLOS and
accepted international customary law. Indeed, UNCLOS provisions for the EEZ and continental shelf
were meant in part to replace historic claims, and
Vietnam might be a good candidate to do this.416 To
improve the deal, the international community should
also support specific historic economic rights for
Vietnam for well-documented activities like fishing,
which would include assured access to the area but
not jurisdiction over it.417 In return for internationally
recognized claims and rights, Vietnam would agree to
fully abide by majority interpretations of UNCLOS to
include freedom of navigation in its EEZ and innocent
passage in its territorial seas, and drop its claim to historic waters or title in the South China Sea.
Unfortunately, there may be less incentive for China to clarify any of its claims in the Spratly Islands.
There are legal and political advantages for China to
obscure its historic, other customary, and UNCLOS
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based claims by “rigidly refus[ing] to clarify the basis
for its claims.”418 China’s historic claims are challenged
in the international community. Its occupation claims
(except for Taiwan’s Itu Aba) are also on literal and
figurative shifting ground, and it has little recourse to
coastal EEZ or proximity claims in the Spratly Islands.
An ambiguous stance therefore allows China to shift
its claim-support as circumstances dictate and not be
held accountable to defend its claims in the context of
international law, “even as the growth of its military
and maritime assets gain physical leverage over its
weaker neighbors.”419 China may use ambiguity as a
way to deflect U.S. and other outside maritime states’
involvement by obscuring issues during negotiations,
and thereby keep what it considers regional bilateral
issues from being internationalized.420 The lack of
specificity may also result from political divides on
these issues within the government of the PRC, which
may make any change in policy arduous.421 China may
be playing a weak hand by keeping it close to its chest.
However, there may be influential elements in
the Chinese government that see its international
role growing and that its current restrictive navigation policy not only sets the PRC at odds with most
other states, but also with its own future needs as an
emerging world power desiring access to littoral regions around the world. Among its divergent agencies, the argument might prevail that the PRC should
rely on its growing navy for defense of its home waters rather than weaker legalistic methods which may
later be used against it, especially if mutually acceptable methods to open EEZs to navigation are made in
arrangements similar to INCSEA. At least one commentator has noted that the PRC’s recent legislation
and policy statements seem to be part of a trend of
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historic waters being “gradually turned into the EEZ
and continental shelf of the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos,” without actually foregoing yet its assertions
for historic rights.422 Most parties would not want the
United States to be directly involved in negotiating
any such schemes, but it could, nonetheless, support
such solutions indirectly through its good offices, expertise, and material support.
U.S. Economic Interests.
Open economic access to the South China Sea
maritime commons is the second U.S. interest listed
by Secretary Clinton.423 PACOM’s regional strategy
also acknowledges the importance of open access to
the shared commons in the Asia-Pacific region, adding “that continued economic prosperity is tied to
the peaceful rise of China as an economic and military power,”424 making this economic issue one also
linked to security. Within the bounds of UNCLOS,
economic access includes universal rights for commercial shipping and the opportunity to exploit the
natural resources of the high seas. Short of open conflict or blockade, however, the only threat to commercial passage in the South China Sea is its designation
as historic waters which would subject passage to restrictions similar to transiting internal waters, worse
than what foreign military craft have faced in PRC
and Vietnamese EEZs. To date this remains just a possibility since neither China nor Vietnam try to regulate commercial traffic through their claimed historic
waters or maritime jurisdictions.425 Thus, the issue of
commercial passage through the South China Sea, an
important U.S. national interest, is directly linked to
the determination of historic waters in the region.
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If commercial navigation is not currently a problem, commercial exploitation of South China Sea resources may be. By the UNCLOS preamble, the high
seas are interpreted as:
the area of the seabed and ocean floor and the subsoil
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, as
well as its resources, are the common heritage of mankind, the exploration and exploitation of which shall
be carried out for the benefit of mankind.”426

Although UNCLOS does regulate fishing and mineral extraction that are the most common forms of economic use in these deep sea areas,427 developed countries with high-end technology, expertise, and capital
have an advantage in exploiting “the common heritage of mankind.” For this reason, UNCLOS includes
a regime through the International Sea-Bed Authority (ISA) to regulate the remote gathering of strategic
metals from the seabed floor, considered the potentially most lucrative activity of the high seas, and to
provide for distribution of part of the gained profits to
all nations.428 As a semi-enclosed sea, however, Article
123 also gives the bordering states rights and duties
to manage, conserve, and exploit the living resources of the sea and protect the marine environment,429
which raises questions about who will manage which
parts of these high seas. None of the South China Sea
parties, especially China, are likely to accept opening
their sea’s bounty to shared profits under ISA rules.430
Each of the South China Sea states has demonstrated
its desire to maximize natural resource gains from the
sea, which this monograph has shown is a major factor in the disputes and violence among them.431 U.S.
interests in the economic uses of the high seas would
be governed by UNCLOS if the United States joins,
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but potentially also by the South China Sea neighbors
based on their maritime claims or cooperative administration as a semi-enclosed sea.432
Disregarding the historic waters issue, which
would make exploitation of this sea by other states
moot, the tangled claims in the South China Sea leave
in doubt how much may be high sea, and how much
are within national jurisdictions. If measured as just
EEZs from coastal baselines without any islands generating more than territorial waters—the position taken
by Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines—then high
seas would be the elongated center of the South China
Sea from north of Macclesfield Bank, down to and including the western Spratly Islands to southwest of
Rifleman Bank.433 Should China succeed in its claim
for the Paracel Islands and prove they are habitable,
which is better supported than any of the Spratlys being so designated, a large swath around Macclesfield
Bank would become Chinese EEZ and significantly reduce the size of the northern high seas area.434 Should
Itu Aba or other Spratly Islands be awarded to a state
and recognized as habitable, or if the Philippines establishes its claim to Kalaya’an through archipelagic
rules, then nearly all of the South China Sea would
be blotted from high sea status because the newly established EEZs would butt up against those from the
main lands.435 Commercial rights to sea life, mineral,
and energy resources on the high seas depends in part
on how territorial claims and maritime jurisdictions
are delimitated based on island sovereignty, because
the remainder becomes high seas for any state’s access. How this is resolved is of interest to the United
States to ensure open access to the high seas here and
elsewhere in the world, and to maintain the peace.
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U.S. economic interests face two problems then
in the Spratly Islands region: the UNCLOS rules concerning exploitation of the high seas, and whether
there may even be high seas available in the area. The
United States has not formally ratified UNCLOS for
several reasons, a main one is that objections to Part XI
cover exploitation of the deep seabed. Its provisions
are considered statist and not free-market oriented,
and the ISA is expensive and inefficient.436 Opponents
also see little gain in the South China Sea for U.S.
ratification since the overlapping disputes would not
only remain but have no compulsory settlement agreement, and maritime jurisdiction issues like freedom
of navigation are exempt from mandatory arbitration
mechanisms. Thus, they argue, these political issues
do no change whether the United States is a member
or not.437 The irony of opposing U.S. entry to UNCLOS
is that in the nearly 30 years since it was written, no
country or corporation, including the United States,
has been successful in commercially mining for high
seas mineral resources, but the United States, which
has the world’s largest aggregate EEZ, benefits from
the economic and environmental protection of its littoral that UNCLOS provides.438 By its present stance,
the United States gains freedom from the ISA to potentially mine sea bed resources some day since it
does not need to be a member of UNCLOS to exploit
international waters under customary law, but it loses
the advantages of being inside the Sea Treaty system to guide it and employ its provisions for future
U.S. benefit.
Of greater importance for U.S. interests than the
rules covering the economic exploitation of the high
seas are the regimes that may govern these waters. In
addition to the different possibilities for maritime ju-
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risdictions based on awarded sovereignty presented
herein, several multilateral governing regimes have
been proposed, especially diplomatic solutions relying on joint development of the sovereign and/or international zones of the South China Sea. Indonesian
scholar Hasjim Djalal proposed a “doughnut formula”
in which the international waters at the center of the
South China Sea would be managed by the neighboring states as a Joint Development Zone (JDZ) to share
resources, or a less robust Joint Management Zone
(JMZ) to facilitate research and measures to protect
the environment and fishing stocks per UNCLOS Article 123.439 In these arrangements, jurisdiction claims
are retained by states in disputed areas, but each state
has a part in the exploration, development, or protection based on a sharing agreement in ways that
could also become confidence building measures.440
On a small scale, successful joint development areas
already operate between Vietnam and Malaysia (with
weak joint commission oversight), and Thailand and
Malaysia (with strong oversight).441 Such cooperative
agreements could be expanded to be multilateral and
cover some or all of the Spratly Islands or the entire
South China Sea. By sharing resources and finally generating some of its economic potential, joint management could calm the conflicts among the South China
Sea parties.
Several models of joint development have been offered, which vary in how much sovereignty the group
claims over the high seas, how dominant anyone state
is in controlling the region’s administration, and the
acceptance of such solutions and participation by the
international community. One precedent proposed is
to apply the Svalbard Treaty of 1920 as a model for
the Spratly Islands, granting one state restricted pow-
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ers as the administrator over the islands, while other
treaty participants would retain wide economic rights
to the area and continue to use currently occupied
land features which would be demilitarized.442 Which
country would be given control would be contentious
with China vying as the dominant power (militarily,
in its historic assertion, and as occupier of Itu Aba the
key Spratly land feature) to which the others would
probably not agree. Valencia, Van Dyke, and Ludwig
refine this concept, adding a Spratly Management
Authority administered in one of three ways: shares
are given and China holds a plurality stake; the area
is managed through bilateral agreements between
China and the other states; or the Authority is open
to admittance by all states that ratify a Svalbard-like
“Spratly Islands Treaty.”443 This third solution awards
sovereignty of the islands to a state, but shares its development and profits with other states that invest under the agreement. Opening the treaty to all states to
sign and participate would give it wider international
legitimacy that the current unilateral state claims lack,
and could ensure that the high seas remain international for economic development.
A variation to this Svalbard solution is that the disputant states submit to UNCLOS archipelagic rules in
defining the Spratlys and then divide interests in the
entity. In this case, one of the weakest states, the Philippines, would have to be the sovereign as the only eligible archipelagic state. The responsibilities and benefits for the economic development and administration
of the region could be split among the five claimants
in several ways, but if coastline length on the South
China Sea were used (which is what the International
Court of Justice uses when adjusting for fairness under the “equity principle”), the shares would be: PRC
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and Taiwan, 37 percent; the Philippines, 28 percent;
Vietnam, 20 percent; Malaysia 14, percent; and Brunei,
2 percent.444 This solution, too, would award clear sovereignty to one state, and, as part of an archipelago,
the Spratlys would have baselines that generate an
EEZ which would encompass most of the current high
seas. This solution fulfills Secretary Clinton’s goals of
land and maritime claims based on recognized international (UNCLOS) law in a collaborative diplomatic
process.445 Awarding sovereignty to one of the militarily and economically weakest states in the region
might hold appeal to the other disputants, especially
if China gets the most shares. The United States might
also concur with a traditional ally as the choice. This
solution would eliminate, however, most of the high
seas areas in the South China Sea, and shut out other
states from use of the region.
The opposite approach to assigning sovereignty
over the islands and sharing in their economic development is to follow the Antarctica Treaty System
model in the Spratlys. Applying Antarctic Treaty principles here would envisage that all land claims and
resource interests be set aside (neither recognized nor
renounced), the region be demilitarized, and environmental protections and scientific research take precedence.446 Rather than a state, an international body like
the proposed “International Spratly Authority” composed of treaty members with demonstrated interests
in the region, would oversee the area’s economic development under a scheme similar to the Convention
on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities. The region could also become a marine park
under rules similar to Antarctica’s Environmental
Protection Protocol and UNCLOS provisions enjoining states around a semi-enclosed sea to protect its en-
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vironment.447 The languishing Coordinating Body of
the Seas of East Asia (COBSEA) could be revitalized
under this scheme to better coordinate and manage
fisheries and protection of the environment.448 Under this scheme, no sovereignty is awarded, and the
waters remain international. Occupying states could
retain their bases, as research stations are maintained
in Antarctica, but would have to be demilitarized. Although China, Malaysia, Japan, and the United States
are among the signatories of the Antarctic Treaty, a
similar South China Sea Treaty would probably be rejected by the claiming states, especially the dominant
state China, for their loss of economic opportunity and
reduced security interests. For the United States, this
solution meets its stated national interests and uses a
collective diplomatic process to arrive at a solution.
But without the support of the South China Sea states,
there is little prospect for long-term security or stability; thus, this would not be a viable option.
The economic concern for the United States in these
schemes is whether such development in the high
seas is a venture under UNCLOS or customary law
provisions that recognize all states’ rights, or whether
the high seas are to be controlled and administered
by a group entity. In some of these options, a jointly
shared regional commons is formed around the Spratlys through combining historic interests or the convenient interpretation that maritime jurisdictions are
generated from the islands. The resulting commons
then pools the region’s resources for mutual benefit of
the claimants. This type of approach is not explicitly
sanctioned in UNCLOS, but has international legal
precedent in which Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador were given “condominium” ownership in the
Gulf of Fonseca case. A similar combination of nation-
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al maritime jurisdictions and shared claims through
a condominium would eliminate all international waters from the South China Sea.449 Although still very
hypothetical, such joint solutions, that liberally interpret international law to economically benefit regional
states and bring peace and security to the region at the
expense of the economic interests of outside parties,
pose a dilemma for the United States. A condominium
solution may impede the potential to exploit the high
seas in the region, or introduce undetermined restrictions to navigation, both contrary to U.S. interests.
On the other hand, such a solution would promote
peace and stability among the states through diplomatic processes, and support economic development
and expand energy availability in a region where it is
sorely needed. The ensuing conflict in U.S. goals for
the region means that, if such solutions are seriously
proposed, they need to include wide international influence to balance all interests and be open to all states
much like the Svalbard Treaty. Although these would
be difficult negotiations, if successful, they would
produce enduring and positive results for all of the
parties involved.
Some of these joint development solutions would
follow PRC communist party leader Deng Xiaoping’s
proclamation in the early 1990s that in the South China Sea, “sovereignty is ours, set aside disputes, pursue
joint development,” a policy which subsequent Chinese leaders have embraced, but of which other leaders are wary.450 This enduring Chinese perspective has
burdened cooperative proposals and the DOC, signed
in 2002 by the PRC and ASEAN, which established
a political framework for peace and stability in the
region, and potential for cooperative development
agreements among the parties.451 The only multilat-
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eral economic arrangement pursued so far has been
the JMSU in 2005 in which the state oil companies
from the PRC, Vietnam, and the Philippines agreed to
conduct joint seismic surveys for oil in their disputed
areas as a confidence building measure.452 The agreement expired in acrimony in 2008, however, because
the smaller states believed the PRC only wished to
explore in disputed areas near their shores, but not in
contested areas in which China was unilaterally exploiting.453 Despite this failure and China’s overbearing policy, U.S. policy supports joint projects in the
region such as the start of drafting a code of conduct
to the DOC in 2011.454 The United States also supports
Philippine President Benigno Aquino’s proposal for
the multilateral Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship,
and Cooperation to establish joint research and economic development bodies over undisputed areas,
which has proven difficult to implement since everything in the region seems disputed.455
Any joint development or governing deal in the
South China Sea is burdened by the lack of compromise and division among the ASEAN countries, and
distrust of a domineering PRC as demonstrated in
this monograph.456 The PRC, for its part, is also suspicious that other states are encroaching on its claims
and prosperity.457 An analysis of this situation by the
International Crisis Group warns that:
Joint development, while an opportunity for claimants
to cooperate and thereby reduce tensions, has stalled
as claimants resist China’s demands that they first accept its sovereignty over disputed areas. The failure to
reduce the risks of conflict, combined with the internal
economic and political factors . . . are pushing claimants toward more assertive behavior. . . . [C]laimants
would benefit from taking concrete steps toward the

95

joint management of hydrocarbon and fishing resources, as well as toward reaching a common ground
on the development of a mechanism to mitigate or
de-escalate incidents, even if they cannot agree on an
overall approach to dispute resolution.458

Thus, it is unlikely that China will enter into
negotiations or a cooperative economic agreement as
an equal with other regional sovereign states, which
affects the United States and ASEAN countries’
approaches in this region.459 The proposals discussed
here show that the South China Sea disputes persist
not for lack of innovative solutions, but because of
the lack of political will and domestic agendas of the
participants.
United States: Honest Broker or Balancer?
Based on U.S. interests and policies presented so
far, how should the United States engage in the South
China Sea disputes? It can play one of two roles, and
over time will probably engage in both as it pursues
its interests in navigation and economic development,
and as changing circumstances dictate. The first role
is that of honest broker among the disputants helping, along with other states, to resolve these thorny
issues through “respect for international law . . . collaborative diplomatic process . . . without coercion
. . . [and] not take sides. . .” as proposed by Secretary Clinton.460 The new Secretary of Defense, Chuck
Hagel, has also stressed addressing threats through
engagement.461 The other role is that of balancer
recognizing that the sovereign states in the region
do not meet on a level playing field, and that U.S.
commitments and national interests obligate the Unit-

96

ed States to take some parochial positions for its own
benefit or to support an enduring overall solution.462
These U.S. approaches compensate for the PRC strategy
in which claims for land sovereignty and maritime delimitation are conducted bilaterally to gain advantage
over weaker claimants, while lesser and more encompassing issues like safety, anti-crime, and environmental protection may follow a multilateral approach.463
Brzezinski recently summed up this dual role for the
United States as the “balancer and conciliator between
the major powers in the East.“464 This could be similar
to the U.S. position between Taiwan and the PRC in
that it both supports and restrains its partner while
also constructively engaging a sometime competitor
and collaborator. For this reason, harmonizing these
two roles is crucial to American, ASEAN, and Chinese
long-term interests in regional peace, cooperation,
and prosperity.
When it serves to advance solutions in the Spratly Islands, the United States should play the role of
honest broker because it shares common goals and
interests for peace and stability with China and the
ASEAN states.465 Since its recent rise to regional power, China and the United States keep returning to a
“constructive strategic partnership,” despite intermittent intervening crises, because their long-term interests ultimately overlap and the need to manage them
together continues.466 The role of honest broker in the
South China Sea will encourage this engagement with
China as equals, while offering additional benefits of
allowing the United States to represent general international interests in the region, and dampen ASEAN
claimants’ potential to overplay a position when the
United States acts as a balancer on their behalf.467 As
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an honest broker, U.S. policy in National Security
Presidential Directive (NSPD) 41 seeks to:
enhanc[e] international relationships and promot[e]
the integration of U.S. allies and international and private sector partners into an improved global maritime
security framework to advance common security interests in the Maritime Domain.468

Following this line, PACOM’s strategy supports
multilateral approaches with regional groups like
ASEAN to develop relationships that build trust
and reinforce international norms, and also engages
with China to achieve a variety of common bilateral
and multilateral goals.469 Secretary Clinton especially singled out the long awaited full code of conduct
negotiations, that will supplement the 2002 DOC, in
which the United States as a conciliator is “prepared
to facilitate initiatives and confidence building measures” among the parties.470 Such measures build the
necessary trust in the United States to help respond to
crises or when support is needed, and is simply good
diplomatic practice in a tense region with important
U.S. interests.471
U.S. and regional state interests are best served
with an involved United States that can play the conciliator role when needed. This monograph has outlined why U.S. interests are served this way, but so
are regional stability and peace. Without American
involvement stronger states may assert themselves in
the disputes more, while, through miscalculation or
domestic pressure, weaker states may start incidents
they may not be able to contain.472 Among the regional
powers, neither China nor ASEAN, with substantial
direct interests in the dispute, nor Japan, with indirect
interests similar to the United States but with a nega98

tive legacy that makes it distrusted in the region, can
substitute in this role.473 Indonesia, through the Track
II talks it has hosted since 1990, has played the role of
diplomatic conciliator in the South China Sea disputes,
but Indonesia, too, has maritime conflicts with China
and lacks the substantial resources that the United
States can bring to influencing solutions.474 The United
States can be a good mediator because it has enough
interests in the disputes to remain engaged, the power
to be heeded in council, important overlapping interests with each party (especially China) to be cautious
and balanced, sufficient distance from the region to
prefer local initiatives and solutions, and is willing
to include all affected states in the process through
programs like its Global Maritime Partnership.475
This U.S. stance has been called “active neutrality,”
but when necessary that includes direct actions like
confronting the PRC when U.S. navigation interests
are threatened, while also restraining an ally, such as
when President Obama reminded President Aquino,
when looking for more support for Philippine claims,
that, “The United States will provide support for principled negotiations and a peaceful resolution, but not
specific outcomes.”476 The United States is thus an important factor in promoting the peaceful and prosperous environment to which China and the other Asian
states have contributed and mutually benefited, but
the United States has done so by allowing the states
involved to take the initiative for mediation.477
As shown, however, the U.S. position has not been
strictly neutral, and the United States has become
involved in disputes when deemed necessary. Until
the 1995 Mischief Reef incident, the United States did
not intervene in the Spratlys because the disputes did
not affect global stability or major U.S. interests. Since
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the end of the Cold War, as the United States has perceived increasing threats to the sea lanes and potential
for military conflict in the South China Sea, Chinese
observers believe that U.S. policy has evolved from active neutrality to “active concern,” and as a result has
become more willing to intervene.478 PRC officials see
a less impartial United States siding with the Southeast Asian states at its expense, at least indirectly if
not in public, and that the United States may be slowly
abandoning neutrality.479 The strategic shift of focus
to the Pacific Rim and East Asia is a major example
of a more active and potentially parochial role for the
United States. The ASEAN states have found China’s
claims and behavior in the region to be overbearing
and threatening, and quietly welcome the U.S. commitment to deterring potential aggression from the
PRC to ensure security and allow negotiations toward
a settlement.480 Their fear is that when vital Chinese
interests have been threatened, the PRC has resorted
to conflict to protect them, even against a superior
power, 481 and there is a possibility that the South
China Sea may prove to be one of those core Chinese
interests.482 Through its military, economic, and political power; cultivated ties with the disputants; and its
own national interests; the United States alone may be
the “external balancer providing security guarantees
to whatever state may be attacked by another, and
thereby making regional balances-of-power much less
significant.”483
Partiality in the disputes is due in part because the
United States holds formal defense treaty alliances
with Japan and the Philippines. The United States and
the Philippines share a 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty
which was reaffirmed by both defense chiefs in June
2013. It is usually interpreted not to include defending
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the disputed Spratly Islands, however, and the United
States did not, for instance, intervene in the Philippine’s Mischief Reef incident with the PRC.484 However, the treaty also allows the Philippines to request
assistance from the United States if any of its forces
are attacked anywhere in the Pacific region, which
could apply to some scenarios in the South China Sea.
The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty also requires the United States to take action for the common
defense (both the Philippines and Thailand) if peace
in the treaty area is threatened; the treaty area specifically includes the South China Sea.485 Although the
organization part of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) dissolved in 1977, the collective defense treaty and its obligations remain in effect.486 The
Obama administration has also worked to promote
more unity within ASEAN, which has no real defense
arrangement, to better withstand Chinese pressure. To
this end PACOM’s strategy seeks to strengthen relationships with ASEAN and its states, and specifically
“enhance our partnerships with Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, Vietnam, and others to advance common
interests and address shared threats.”487 Brzezinski
concludes that in Asia the United States should play
the dual role of conciliator and regional balancer, as
the United Kingdom (UK) did in 19th-century European politics, by “mediating conflicts and offsetting
power imbalances among potential rivals.”488
American balancing actions have weighed against
China when needed but usually in a way to not endanger its role as conciliator. In 2010, the United States
maneuvered the ARF agenda to make the South China
Sea disputes a primary topic for multilateral, not bilateral, discussions; and at the subsequent ARF meeting
in Hanoi Secretary Clinton denounced unilateral ac-
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tions in the South China Sea and supported the need
for all parties to negotiate a code of conduct. This
indirectly condemned China for both its aggressive
actions and its recalcitrance to an already agreed to
procedure, while offering the olive branch of conciliation at the same time to rectify the situation.489 Balancing also means strengthening the ASEAN states’
military capabilities through establishing or strengthening military cooperation agreements and forward
deploying U.S. forces into East Asia.490 These moves
support U.S. interests in the South China Sea as declared by Secretary Clinton, thereby “internationalizing” the disputes to the consternation of the PRC
which loses diplomatic and military clout.491 U.S. intervention has been overt as well. The United States,
for instance, loudly condemned Chinese actions to
establish the Sansha municipality on the South China
Sea islands, while not criticizing similar earlier actions
by Vietnam and the Philippines.492 U.S. officials have
also described Chinese jurisdiction claims within the
U-shaped line as excessive, and thereby some analysts
believe “the United States is now a disputant in the
South China Sea disputes.”493 However, for the United
States such measures provide the region the military
security needed for diplomacy to operate on a relatively level field, or as a past Vietnamese ambassador
bluntly stated, ”If the United States does not show
some signs of support for the smaller countries on this
issue, Vietnam will have no choice but to accommodate China. . . .”494
The United States must adroitly manage its dual
roles. Because of its own interests and formal obligations, the United States should continue to play the
balancer role, but needs to account for the significant
benefits and hazards to the region in terms of peace
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and stability.495 U.S. involvement acts to deter the use
of force, balancing weaker regional states’ power with
that of the PRC, and thereby constraining the parties to
work within a diplomatic and legal framework (while
also drawing the smaller states closer to the United
States).496 For instance, after Secretary Clinton’s greater interest in the South China Seas at the 2010 ARF,
a Vietnamese diplomat could exclaim that China did
not take Vietnam seriously before, but “they talk to
us now.”497 The United States must be alert, however,
to not let such support embolden some states and increase regional instability, as a Philippine presidential
spokesperson appeared to do when commenting that
the U.S. presence “bolsters our ability to assert our
sovereignty over certain areas.”498 United States support to a common ASEAN position in the South China
Seas could be seen as hostile by the Chinese and make
the region more violent.499 Chinese observers believe
that its bilateral engagements with the other states
were beneficial to the region until U.S. provocations
internationalized the disputes through “gunboat”
policy.500 Too much or misapplied U.S. support in the
region will not only alienate China, but could also sow
discord among the ASEAN states, which runs counter
to American intentions for ASEAN unity to balance
Chinese power.501
Because of many mutual interests and strong economic embrace, the United States must remain delicate and agile in its involvement in the region, but it
must remain involved because there is no viable alternative state for the roles it plays. As an honest broker
to the region, it offers resources and a proclivity for
mediation that in the long run will result in solutions
yielding a more stable, prosperous, and peaceful region based on the disputants’ participation. As a bal-
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ancer, the United States sets the conditions needed for
all states to engage as bilateral or multilateral equals
in the spirit of international law. Because the United
States does this to further its own interests in conjunction with those of China and the ASEAN states,
its commitment to these goals should be significant
and enduring through building trust and reinforcing
international norms. The United States alone can deter aggression by any state or combination of states,
and is sometimes obligated by treaty to do so. China
and the ASEAN states should accept the United States
as an honest broker to keep America’s role relatively
neutral, but also allow it to balance to ensure better
solutions are determined in equal negotiations or under international law. Should the United States play
its dual roles correctly, it can be called upon to be both
mediator and deterrent to aggression as envisioned
by former Philippine President Fidel Ramos.502 Should
the United States over emphasize either role, it could
embolden aggression by appearing too weak to enforce stability or too partisan to contribute to peace.
Thus, Brzezinski concludes, “If the United States and
China can accommodate each other on a broad range
of issues, the prospects for stability in Asia will be
greatly increased.“503
CONCLUSION
The region around the Spratly Islands and the
South China Sea may be called the Dangerous Ground
indeed. It is fraught with physical, economic, political,
and military hazards that require delicate navigation.
This region is important to the economies of the surrounding states in terms of the fish they eat and sell
and the vast potential for natural gas and oil needed to
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fuel their growing economies. This bonanza of riches
spurs much of the out-sized claims in the region that
result in diplomatic and physical clashes. This is unfortunate because the conditions these confrontations
create reduce outside investment in the region, squander resources through their unregulated use, and hinder the states from cooperating for their mutual economic benefit. The high flow of maritime commerce
through the South China Sea is also crucial to the
economic well-being of the region and the world. Although the waters around the Spratly Islands are economically important, the islands themselves have not
been. However, occupation of the islands dictate control of the surrounding sea’s wealth and navigation,
and could legally or militarily control maritime traffic
and the waters’ economic exploitation. Thus, the land
features are important to these states for security purposes, and because possession of them may be the key
to controlling the coveted surrounding waters. Claim
and authority over these land features is strengthened
by the establishment of around 50 remote military
garrisons on these islets, which increases the militarization of the dispute with an increased risk of conflict.
Although direct military confrontations among
the claimant states have diminished since the 1990s,
civilian enforcement agencies have been active in protecting claimed spaces sometimes employing violence
resulting in deaths. Because partner countries rely
on the United States to ensure stability in the South
China Sea and to address its own interests in maintaining freedom of navigation rights and economic
development of the international sea bed, the United
States should remain engaged with the South China
Sea states on issues of mutual concern. The United
States has also been embroiled in the region through
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confrontation with the PRC over rights of navigation
through claimed waters and in support of partners
and allies. The United States must be wary, then, of
both overplaying its position or having an ally do so
and alienating the PRC, or allowing the PRC to use the
South China Sea as a crucible in which to test American resolve or bait a trap as part of a confrontational
military rise. To better address these concerns, policymakers need to understand the underlying problems
and conflicting claims that threaten security and prosperity in this region.
The use of customary and UNCLOS law in establishing claims to the Spratlys and surrounding waters
helps explain both the perspectives of the disputants
and how they have in part interacted with each other and the United States on the issues of rights and
claims. Their legal positions are especially important
for American policymakers as they inform possible
solutions and suggest how to contribute to peace and
prosperity in the region. Three key legal questions
must be answered to help sort the disputes: sovereignty over the islets, the nature of a claimed land
feature, and the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction. Sovereignty is claimed through customary law,
with China and Vietnam both using historic doctrine
to claim the entire South China Sea, while they also
use the doctrine of occupation to claim some land features, the method which the Philippines and Malaysia
also employ. The establishment of UNCLOS precepts
made otherwise unproductive land features valuable.
Establishing control over them using customary law
has sometimes spurred clashes.
Since the historic claims are expansive and unconvincingly documented in the views of many experts,
claims made through discovery and occupation are
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more influential. In this, Vietnam, the Philippines,
Malaysia, the PRC, and Taiwan each lay claim to parts
of Spratly features based on their status as once res
nullis during various times in modern history. Taiwan
also claims all of the land features based on its occupation of the largest island which is an interpretation
of customary law that is in dispute. The Philippines
Kalaya’an claim to most of the islands through its proximity is not backed with effective occupation. Each of
these states supports its claims with efforts at effective
administration through establishing laws governing
its possessions under municipal governments, economic activities, or military occupation. Each state’s
claims are also disputed with counter-claims by other
South China Sea states leaving physical possession of
a feature the surest guide to ownership with no state
holding effective legal sovereignty over all. General
recognition of the current occupation situation of the
Spratly Islands would settle some of the disputes, but
could launch other dangerous problems through a
new round of seizures, claims, and possible violence
to gain the potential benefits of as yet unoccupied
land features.
Developed to reflect modern interpretations of international law, UNCLOS offers guidance to maritime
disputes in the South China Sea but is not a comprehensive solution. Once sovereignty of a land feature is
determined, UNCLOS stipulates its jurisdiction over
surrounding waters based on its human characteristics. This process is meant to maintain tranquility
in the ocean commons through establishing various
maritime zones with graduated degrees of sovereign
rights for the state. Islands designated as inhabitable
or economically viable accrue more consideration
than uninhabitable rocks and other features, making

107

only some of the occupied areas in the Spratlys eligible to establish a modest maritime jurisdiction, and
probably none meet the habitable standard to garner
full jurisdiction. This would leave the waters around
the Spratlys mainly under the maritime control of
the surrounding land masses, or as international waters unless the claiming states cooperate under the
guise of the enclosed sea rules to establish a joint
maritime zone.
Once sovereignty and feature type are determined, zones of authority may be established by the
occupying state depending on the distance from its
established shore baseline. Internal, archipelagic,
and historic waters are maritime variations of nearfull sovereign control, which could be disruptive to
economic and navigation activities if awarded to any
state to govern all of the Spratly waters. Vietnam or
China, for instance, could control the entire South
China Sea if either historic claim was affirmed, or the
Philippines would control its Kalaya’an claim with an
extensive EEZ if the Spratlys were determined to be an
extension of the Philippine archipelago. Islands above
the high tide mark establish territorial waters and a
contiguous zone, which would carve 24-nm zones like
Swiss cheese around the Spratlys, but should allow innocent passage even if restricting most other maritime
activities. However, Vietnam, Malaysia, and China
do not recognize innocent passage for naval ships,
which makes such zones a major concern for the U.S.
Government.
Since the length of the 200-nm EEZ allows much
potential overlap among land masses and islands in
the semi-enclosed South China Sea, their delimitation
through equidistant or equitable principles affects
jurisdiction, and, like territorial waters, some states
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restrict military activities within the EEZ beyond the
economic regulation normally allowed. Habitability
of an island is a significant issue for EEZ delimitation
since only populated or economically viable islands
may claim an EEZ. The awarding of an EEZ under
several scenarios then affects freedom of navigation
and the potential for U.S. economic development in
otherwise international waters. Although such arguments by claimants for more restrictions in these zones
are tenuous, they could be useful justification to cover
military actions by states like China, which is the most
active in enforcing a restrictive EEZ.
Freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is
the most immediate concern for the United States to
ensure naval vessels retain all the rights of access allowed in the region under international maritime law.
Current policies in China, Vietnam, and Malaysia restrict foreign naval activity in their zones beyond that
normally attributed to UNCLOS. This is a bad precedent for U.S. maritime access around the world, but
the United States has options to improve the situation
in the South China Sea. First, it has already signed the
MMCA with the PRC to reduce the number of maritime incidents between the two countries. Concluding an Incidents at Sea Agreement with the PRC would
clarify further the rights and responsibilities between
the two, especially when operating within each other’s maritime jurisdictions while also remaining fully
compliant with international law and significantly reducing the potential for future clashes. Other forms
of government to government interaction would build
confidence in present and future agreements, leverage common interests, as the USCG has done so well
with its PRC counterparts, and would also reduce tensions in the region to enhance freedom of navigation.
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Through engagement activities of regionally aligned
forces, the U.S. Army could become a significant influence in making the United States both a conciliator
and balancer in the region.
U.S. ratification of UNCLOS is another important
step to influence the evolution of future interpretations
of freedom of navigation toward more open stipulations than some of the states around the South China
Sea now espouse. Although a more difficult proposition, the United States should demand the clarification
of the historic claims made in the South China Sea, in
order to facilitate negotiating a settlement, accelerate
economic development, and remove the potential of
shutting down all foreign navigation through the region. Support to Vietnam’s current islet occupations
in the Spratlys, its claims to coastal EEZ and continental shelf areas in compliance with UNCLOS, and
specific historic economic rights could wean Vietnam
from its otherwise weak historic claims, and pursue
U.S. policy that countries comply with generally accepted views of international law. The United States
has less influence to change China’s position on historic rights because the ambiguity of its positions has
served China well. Here, appealing to China’s future
role in world politics may help to change its parochial
freedom of navigation perspective into a more global
one like the United States holds. The United States has
several options in the region to preserve freedom of
navigation in the South China Sea.
Open economic access to the South China Sea maritime commons is a second U.S. interest, but one which
may diverge from freedom of navigation. Access to
the resources of the high seas has been an important
enough U.S. interest to stall the ratification of UNCLOS
for nearly 20 years in order to avoid the restrictions
imposed on seabed mining, although this activity has
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yet to become commercially viable. However, while
the United States remains outside the treaty, it holds
less influence over how maritime law is interpreted
and evolves, and thus is at a disadvantage to shape
events like whether the South China Sea becomes a
wholly divided and claimed sea. Such arrangements
as a Joint Development Zone or a Joint Management
Zone could stabilize the area to provide stability and
economic development for its participants. This could
detract from potential U.S. economic development
activities, depending on the arrangements, but supports U.S. security and economic prosperity goals for
the region as well as attaining a diplomatic settlement
through recognized international law.
Joint solutions could include a sharing arrangement through a Svalbard-like Spratly Islands Treaty
in which the United States could participate, or shares
in a Philippine administered archipelagic annexation
from which the United States would be excluded.
A different approach in which no sovereignty was
awarded would follow the Antarctic Treaty model in
which the Spratlys would be administered by an international authority, but the resulting diminution of
bordering states’ security and development interests
in this choice makes it less viable. Any joint or shared
solution would be more acceptable to the international community if outside states could also be a party to
it, but the more inclusive a solution the less attractive
it becomes to the PRC which sees itself as the original sole owner with a growing ability to enforce that
claim. To support any of the joint solutions, the United
States would have to place its security interests over
potential economic ones.
To contribute to overall stability and prosperity
in the region, and its own freedom of navigation and
economic interests, the United States must delicately
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play the roles of conciliator and balancer as circumstances require. The United States is an honest broker
through “active neutrality” because it shares goals in
common with the states around the South China Sea,
in accord with existing U.S. policy. Although the United States may not be truly neutral, it has less direct demands in the disputes, garners more trust than most
other states, and possesses resources to bear on these
problems, making it a useful interlocutor in resolving
problems.
In other circumstances, the United States has intervened in problems around the Spratly Islands in more
parochial ways to balance the diplomatic field in aid
of allies and defense partners, and to directly protect
its freedom of navigation interests in a policy some
have dubbed “active concern.” Just as the U.S. honest
broker role limits the demands that its partners might
make in the disputes, the balancer role should deter
aggressive stances by any party lest the United States
throw its weight to the other side. The balancer role
is also dictated by U.S. treaty obligation to the Philippines, and because ASEAN lacks a defense arrangement by which to counter the influence of a much
stronger PRC. As a balancer, the United States has
improved ASEAN states’ military capabilities and cooperation, and challenged Chinese actions which Chinese officials have complained “internationalizes” the
issues. The balancing role should be minimal so as not
to overshadow the conciliator role, since both are necessary roles that only the United States can play well
in order to achieve the peaceful settlements toward
security and economic interests that ultimately all the
states want. In short, all parties should welcome a nuanced U.S. role as both conciliator, to keep the United
States relatively neutral in the disputes, and balancer,
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to deter aggressive actions and thus support diplomatic solutions.
This monograph presented the most important
economic, security, and diplomatic interests that
the United States has in the region. Its involvement
as described must be nuanced to balance conflicting requirements to ensure its freedom of navigation
through these waters, which also reinforces similar
rights around the world, and economic development
interests. The balancer role ensures that allies and
partners may represent themselves as full sovereign
states in negotiations with each other, while the United
States simultaneously maintains good economic and
diplomatic relations with each of the claimant states
as a conciliator. For these reasons, the United States
has again made the Asia-Pacific region a major focus
of its stated global interests, and converging national
interests between the United States and China may indicate that some progress on the issues outlined here
are possible.
The importance of the Spratly Islands region to
world trade, energy, and security; the intricacy of the
bitter problems involved; and its own interests require careful American involvement in this Dangerous Ground. To best address the disputes, policymakers must understand the underlying territorial and
maritime claims of the PRC, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines in order to
help manage these issues peacefully and equitably for
the regional states, and to meet U.S. interests. In the
end, the conflict in the Spratly Islands is not one for
the United States to solve, but its ability to contribute,
facilitate, balance, or support is necessary to achieve a
solution from which all may benefit.
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